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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Tbi- K * mil has appellate jiu'isdictionovu liiumi iinit'i1. nl ihr I hinl f ii iiiiii in 
l u i I I I I HI I I l i t i l II i l l I l i iiillli i l l II II I *'' 7 K 1 ^ ( \)(\) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
ISSUE #1. Under Utah law, what are the fiduciary duties between and 
among shareholders, officers inn uimun's in a v u>>e corporal ; 
STAN. • • i HI • nurt 
1
 uw irom other junsdicticns lor guidance." 
Amdt lust Interstate Bank of Utah N.A., I91»9 UT 91, % 17, 991 P.3d 548, ' 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: I\ M aughlin asked the trial coin t to 
adopt the majority position on the Ian ol close COI|MII.IIIUIIS ,i(
 ( iL""( I1, J - A1 .JI 
r*p '; • Defending' M<»tion for Summary 
• .: v itation, McLaughlin filed a Motion to Amend 
. to Add Parties and Causes of Action J - r n 1 and A1574 again arguing 
the existence of fiduciary di lty. The trial court dCl i^- i(11 n.uiu .. ,, 
1
 This case consists of three consolidal u -jismci i umi v. u^ . *« ^ 
040924997, 050914253 and 05090672--, . .* inal court paginated the nv rd 
for appeal, each case was numbered separately. Counsel and the clerk hau 
agreed, that in liei I of repagination, all parties will cite to the record in this case as 
follows: 
1140924997 = Aletseq." . 
050914253 - III et seq. 
Ij:»ll()()(i72() . CI et seq. 
1 
ISSUE #2: Should McLaughlin have been permitted to amend his 
complaint? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's ruling on a motion to amend 
will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. GLFP, Ltd. v. CL Mgt.f 
Ltd., 2007 UT App 131, f 26, 163 P.3d 636. "The discretion granted a trial court 
to deny a motion to amend, however, must be tempered with the mandate of rule 
15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that 'leave [to amend] shall be freely given 
when justice so requires.'" Id. (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a)). "In Aurora Credit 
Services, Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev.y Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998), the Utah 
Supreme Court cited favorably the United States Supreme Court's caution that 
'outright refusal to grant the leave [to amend] without any justifying reason 
appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that 
discretion and inconsistent with the spirit' of the rules of civil procedure." Id. at 
127. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: McLaughlin moved to amend his 
complaint at A1571 and A1574. McLaughlin's proposed Amended Complaint is 
found at A1587. The trial court's ruling denying leave to amend is at A1735. 
ISSUE #3: Was the 2005 ratification by Cookietree's Board and 
shareholders "valid and effective" as a matter of law? 
2 
STAND\RD OF RhVlhW. Summary jinljL'innil is .ilfinin ,1 nily v-Jitu 
'there is no gemii lie i SMI i1 v lo m\ niiiiciuil • .>» and, , i l r moving party is 
i til iticLJ I- A )ti(l(i»iiin i ,»•' i n.'ilter of law. " GLFP, 2007 UT App at f 5 (citing 
I Jtah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This court docs not grant the trial court's legal 
conclusions any deference, reviewing them for correctness j .ai; .i m Ku, 
reviewing a grant of summarx j u a^ 
reasonable tiifcieiiees dra > uosi favorable to the 
i i o m i i o v iiijit I' i l l r Id. ' • 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: Defendants moved for summary 
judgment at A189 and McLaughlin opposed summary judgment al . WlM in ' 
A993. the nidi coini giaum ti I Vlnidani^ mon i i ' • 11 Since multiple 
ai'li'i.' • - - : • " iudement were raised (A993),McLaughli ' 
asked foi a viuiiiicatiun ^ lo the exact basis of the ruling. Al 513 The Court. 
declined to clarify at A173 5 
III' II'KIM IN "1 Ii"1. I' I I1 IIIUIII IV 
# Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(27) "Qualified shares" means, with respect iu a un - * - . , ! 
transaction pursuant to Section 16- 10a 853, anv sir- 4 i 
transaction, except shun--. 
(a) that, .. the km.-w sedge, before the vote, of the secretary, other officer, or 
agent of the corporation authorized to tabi date votes, are beneficially owned; or 
3 
(b) the voting of which is controlled, by: 
(i) a director who has a conflicting interest respecting the transaction; 
(ii) a related person of that director; or 
(iii) persons referred to in Subsections (27)(b)(i) and (ii). 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-850. Definitions relating to conflicting interest 
transactions. 
As used in Sections 16-10a-850 through 16-10a-853: 
(1) "Conflicting interest" with respect to a corporation means the interest a 
director has respecting a transaction effected or proposed to be effected by the 
corporation or by any entity in which the corporation has a controlling interest if: 
(a) whether or not the transaction is brought before the board of directors of the 
corporation for action, the director knows at the time of commitment that the 
director or a related person of the director is a party to the transaction or has a 
beneficial financial interest in or is so closely linked to, the transaction and the 
transaction is so financially significant to the director or a related person of the 
director that the interest would reasonably be expected to exert an influence on the 
director's judgment if the director were called upon to vote on the transaction; or 
(b) the transaction is brought, or is of a character and significance to the 
corporation that it would in the normal course be brought, before the board of 
directors for action, and the director knows at the time of commitment that any of 
the following persons is either a party to the transaction or has a beneficial 
financial interest in, or is so closely linked to, the transaction and the transaction is 
so financially significant to the person that the interest would reasonably be 
expected to exert an influence on the director's judgment if the director were called 
upon to vote on the transaction: 
(i) an entity, other than the corporation, of which the director is a director, 
general partner, agent, or employee or an entity to which the director owes a 
fiduciary duty, other than a fiduciary duty arising because the director is a director 
of the corporation; 
4 
i\\) an individual who is a general partner, p i.ici|/ai, or employer of the directoi 
or who is a beneficiary of a fiduciarx <linv owed by ihe director, other thar 
fiduciary duty arising becan^-* *l« '•• * •• * ••:-><>i ^^^^nvra i iM-
; v i . .iuuia UIK w moie o! the entities specified in Subsection 
11 .,. j • ot dt M v diat is controlled h\m o\ is IPKICI common control with, one or 
more of the entities or individuals specified in Subsection 11 )(h)(n or (l)(b)(ii). 
rn) "Director's conflicting interest tran: , , u . .»!JK I :.J n 
means a transa roposed tu - •_* die corporation 
anyentitvci w^;(.n <.>vTV • .. Hinvnu-h * 
,*• , - p r » 
*; M "Qualified director" means, with tespeo !*>,. director's conflicting interest 
transaction, any director who does not have either a conflicting interest respecting 
the transaction, or a familial, financial, professional, or employment relationship 
w ith a second director who does have a conflicting interest respecting the 
transaction, which relationship would, in the circumstances, reasonably be 
expected to exert a*" :-~'I* • - - ^" ih ' ' * u • ' - ^ judgment when voting on the 
transa*-
K
 Hi..- jd disclosure" means disclosure by the director who has a 
conflicting interest of 
; 'he existence an.: • ii n'liillnlni}11 inii n ' I, ,u»d 
. - , an lacts KIIL . ..I. ihe director respecting the subject matter oi* the 
transaction that an ordinarilv prudent person would reasonably believe to he 
material tu a "idiMneni a? . .,-• u hethei ->; in*-! to proceed i\ ith ihe transaction, 
/
^
N< "Time oi LOiniliJliiiCin - ^ . a lia;. . . ; M I K unit, wucn uiv 
transaction is consummated or, if made pursuant ** ,. , ^ a , the time when the 
corporation or the entity controlled by the corporation becomes contractual Is 
obligated so that its unilateral withdrawal from the transaction would entail 
significant loss, liability, or other damage. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-851. Judicial action. 
.uiion eitectcd or propu&eu ^. i . .:::ivku *
 :> a . . , . 
entit) controucd by the corporation that is not a dnector's con iieresi 
transaction - - • ** u< enjoined, be ci asiile or s^ ive nse to an awaiu ui daiim^^ 
5 
or other sanctions, in a proceeding by a shareholder or by or in the right of the 
corporation, solely because a director, or any person with whom or which the 
director has a personal, economic, or other association, has an interest in the 
transaction. 
(2) A director's conflicting interest transaction may not be enjoined, be set 
aside, or give rise to an award of damages or other sanctions, in a proceeding by a 
shareholder or by or in the right of the corporation, solely because the director, or 
any person with whom or which the director has a personal, economic, or other 
association, has an interest in the transaction, if: 
(a) directors1 action respecting the transaction was at any time taken in 
compliance with Section 16-10a-852; 
(b) shareholders1 action respecting the transaction was at any time taken in 
compliance with Section 16-1 Oa-853; or 
(c) the transaction, judged according to the circumstances at the time of 
commitment, is established to have been fair to the corporation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-852. Directors' action. 
(1) Directors' action respecting a transaction is taken for purposes of 
Subsection 16-10a-851(2)(a) if the transaction received the affirmative vote of a 
majority of those qualified directors on the board of directors or on a duly 
empowered committee of the board who voted on the transaction after either 
required disclosure to them, to the extent the information was not known by them, 
or compliance with Subsection (2), provided that action by a committee is effective 
under this subsection only if: 
(a) all its members are qualified directors; and 
(b) its members are either all of the qualified directors or are appointed by the 
affirmative vote of a majority of the qualified directors. 
(2) If a director has a conflicting interest respecting a transaction, but neither 
the director nor a related person of the director is a party to the transaction, and if 
the director has a duty under law or professional canon, or a duty of confidentiality 
to another person, respecting information relating to the transaction so that the 
director may not make the disclosure described in Section 16-10a-850(4)(b), then 
disclosure is sufficient for purposes of Subsection (1) if the director discloses to the 
6 
directors voting on the transaction, before their \ ote, th i = :: dst = i i : i andnatui e of 
the conflicting interest and informs them of the chara c te i and Hi nitations imposed 
by that di lty. 
,.:,. \ nidj • - 4 the qualified directors on the board of directors or on the 
committee, as the case may be, constitutes a quorum for purposes of action fm! 
complies with this section. Directors' action that otherwise complies with :!u 
section is not affected by the presence or vote of a d*recu>i u ho is not a quail \cd 
director. 
me Aim. $ *• " 
I; shareholders' action respecting a transaction is citective for purposes of 
Subsectioi. o i Oa-851 (2 )c b) if a quorum existed pursuant to Subsection (2) and a 
majorifx of the \otes entitled io hi-, iv-: K holdcis of qualified shares present in 
persot : ; \ pr->x\ at the meeting were cast in tavoi <)f the transaction after notice 
to shareholders describing the directors conflicting interest transaction, provision 
of the information referred to in Subsection (3). and required disclosure to the 
shareholders \\\ ' - J •*" *Ui% h i , K :v , t i ' ^ ^ ^ • r^^nt the information wa^ nut 
known by th^-
-.2} A majorit) oi the \otes entitle 1 to be cast by the holders of all quali*:~J 
shares constitutes a quorum for purposes of action that complies with this section. 
Sub.ru to the provisions of Subsections (3) and (4), shareholders' action that 
otherwise complies with this section is not affected by the presence of ho'--?- ••• -\ 
^
 ,1:-' voting of. ^I'.'i* •- t ]-r :*-c r v4 nvalified shares, 
' for purposes oi compliance wiii. Subsectioi.
 v: . director who ha^ a 
,. f.Micting interest respecting the transaction shall, before the shareholders \ote 
inform the secretary or other officer or agent oi the corporation authorized t 
tabulate votes of the number and the identity o( persons holding or controlling 
vote, of all shares that the director knows are beneficially owned, or the \oting ^i 
which is controlled, by the directs l ' n -.'l.r.vl t\-t- - -^ f iUc ^—*-*- .,*- K ,»I.# 
.. ,; shareholders \^w docs not compo . . Suhsection ( : »soleix because 
oi a iiulure ol a director to comph -\ itli Subsection *3;, and if the director-
establishes that the failure did not determine and was not intended by hin- h » 
influence the oukome of the vote, the court may, w ith i >A ithout further 
proceedings undei Sui -s-. : >. -s 16-10a-851(2)(c), take ain action respecting the 
transaction and the director, and give any effect to die shareholders1 vote, as it 
considers appropriate in fUo circumstances. 
7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Cookietree, Inc. is a close corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and 
distribution of baked goods and cookies. McLaughlin was a vice-president, 
employee and shareholder of Cookietree from 1992-2004 . McLaughlin's wife 
was a human resources executive and shareholder from 1992-2007. Greg Schenk, 
the best man at the McLaughlin's wedding, is the majority shareholder, president 
and CEO of the company. Schenk's wife Gayle was a member of the board. 
Another shareholder, Harold Rosemann serves as the third board member and the 
company's chief financial officer. 
The facts in this case set forth a classic corporate freeze out. In 2004 a 
dispute developed between McLaughlin and Schenk over several issues: 
* Schenk wanted to sell Cookietree to a strategic buyer3. 
* McLaughlin wanted to himself buy Cookietree and exercise his rights 
of first refusal under the 1999 Shareholder Agreement. 
* McLaughlin discovered, and challenged, Schenk's secret acquisition 
of additional Cookietree shares from his father's widow in 1999 claiming the 
McLaughlin and his wife remain shareholders, as there is no viable market for 
their shares. 
3
 A strategic buyer is willing to pay more for a business because the new business 
enhances the buyer's current or exiting business. 
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transaction violated a then-effective 1991 Shareholder's Agreemeril I hr, 
acquisition secured Schenk s majnni', 11 nhnl ol ill mihnii/ed shines in the 
company. • '' ' . 
Mil ;mghlin, in a series of challenges and requests, asserted his shareholder 
rights in the corporation I: formation was "l1.1 V Schenk rehired to consider 
McLaughlin's offers to bvv the companv. Un, .., ,. . . . . _ . - <. 
from meetings anu >.J i ' J 
w 111)< 11 * i vv In,'. - - • • • •! ' • >e some changes around here. *' 
Meanwhile, Schenk signed Letters of Intent with the strategic buyer, Tn • 
correspondence with the bi Iyer and with Cookietree's own consultant, 
find a • ' • ' mi. In an August, 2007 
i - iver, Schenk was asked to "let me kne v\ d you make any progress 
with Sam" [McLaughlin]. Schenk was particularly angry that the 1999 transaction 
had been ;rr—iicd ano
 L ituiicii^ LU ^ecause, irrational I;,, he considered Ins 
deceased ., ' 
veiled effort to place McLaughlin (a lather, of six, four under the 
age of 7) in a position of economic hardship so that he would drop his claims and 
cooperate, ^ :enls fired McLaughlin without cause ano v.,ii,uui a in,,mess 
purpose. Even though Hv.au^m.., *-.;,,., . 
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McLaughlin was entitled to six months notice of termination, Schenk had him 
removed from Cookietree property by police and trespassed from the premises. 
Schenk cut McLaughlin's severance to 1992 levels. McLaughlin was rather 
literally "out on the street." 
In the following days, Schenk and his lawyers approached McLaughlin for a 
"global resolution" which would purportedly resolve the employment issues 
together with the stock issues. McLaughlin declined and sued. Defendants then 
conspired to ratify prior bad actions, even though the ratification was fraught with 
illegality, conflict and interest. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
McLaughlin first filed a Complaint in November 2004 against Cookietree, 
Inc. and Greg Schenk, its majority shareholder. Al (Third District Court Case No. 
040924997; hereinafter "the stock action.") This action challenged a surreptitious 
transfer of stock to Greg Schenk from his father's widow in violation of the 1991 
Shareholder's Agreement. McLaughlin pled a breach of contract claim (A8) and 
breach of fiduciary duty (A 12). In an after-the-fact attempt to legitimize the acts 
complained about in McLaughlin's Complaint, litigation counsel procured 
"waivers" from Cookietree's Board of Directors and some of its shareholders. 
A227; A230 Defendants then brought a motion for summary judgment claiming 
the stock transaction in question had been "ratified." A189 
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In March , 2005 McLaughl in filed a separate action stemi :i il t lg fi: 01 i 1 breaches 
ol Kit Laiigliltn s Lmplo^inenl A g i m n u i l n i l l i l uu lue t i c i , In I I I I  I i in id 
Di ' . l ikl ( (»uil ( \ ise f In I)S()<)067?0; hrnMtinflcr "the? employment action.
 } m^ 
Complaint in the employment action alleged, among other claims, a breach of . 
fiduciary duty against Schenk. C35 Cookietrec and Schenk immediately filed a 
Motinr \? Dismiss arguing thai .viicim wm iot owe Mc mn any fiduciary 
( Ii 
A , ^ i kietree "1'ouiiu and asserted an arbitration agreement. 
A645 v , u ^ ly, certain of McLaughli""N ci iploymenl laims" were referred to 
arbitration. A867 The arbitration and the arbitrated <. iciuns are not a direct part of 
lins uppi, .v KKX> .4,t;;.'i?;. ii.. d 
.• ' .
 ,f
 <J hvssed in arbitration. 
\ 1 ^22-1623 Ilicrcioic, ihc matter v\a^ rebneied. A123b, A127U 
McLaughlin also filed a derivative action w hich was similarly consolidated. 
into the above litigation. Bl and ASK I ( I hird Dish id l ouit Case Nu (I • I IN I I '" . ', 
heieiiiiiltci IIII'IK i h n .illiu" .n linn i I In "a l inn ( niiipLiinh lornied the Icr r < I 
IXIIIi I  . a i i L ' l i l i i f i l i i i i i i s . 
4
 Whi le McLaugh l in does not directly challenge the trial cour t ' s order referring 
certain claims to arbitration < A867) oi <is later pi!i; c declining to set aside the 
arbitration award i A !" >hh McLaughlu.. i^ chalh - ^ m g -he compai lmenta l iza t ion of 
his claims (\<v p 55 infra) and appeals from the entire judgment " 174ifl 
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While the motion for summary judgment on the ratification issue was 
pending, Cookietree also filed the second motion for summary judgment on the 
fiduciary duty issue. A1236 While both were pled, the issue of whether 
McLaughlin's claims were direct or derivative was never litigated. The trial court 
ruled on both motions for summary judgment at A1504. 
The trial court made several errors in its ruling. The decision found that "all 
of the causes of action in [the employment action, including, by implication the 
breach of fiduciary duty claim against Greg Schenk individually] arose from the 
employment relationship." A1506 The trial court found that Greg "Schenk did not 
owe any fiduciary duty to Mr. McLaughlin that applies to the dealings related to 
Mr. McLaughlin in his role as an employee." Id. The trial court found that 
Cookietree, not Greg Schenk, fired McLaughlin, and found that Schenk's "role as 
officer of the [close] corporation d[id] not create any new fiduciary relationship to 
Mr. McLaughlin." A1506-1607 The ruling stated that "[f]or a fiduciary duty 
claim to be present in this case, plaintiff would need to identify a duty, breach and 
damages, separate from any of the contractual obligations that existed between the 
parties." A1508-1509 
The same ruling disposed of the motion for summary judgment on the 
ratification issue by stating that "the 2005 waiver and ratification issues were 
effective as a matter of law." A1508 Regarding this statement, McLaughlin filed 
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a timely Motion to Amend Ruling and Order (A1513; A1518) asking for findings 
of fact and an analysis or clarification of which of the many bases submitted in 
opposition to the ratification the court was rejecting. The trial court declined to 
clarify at A1535. 
Availing himself of the opportunity left open by the trial court to "identify a 
duty, breach and damages separate from any of the contractual obligations that 
existed between the parties" McLaughlin filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint 
to Add Parties and Causes of Action at A1571 articulating each of these categories. 
A1574 McLaughlin filed a proposed Amended Complaint at A1587. The trial 
court denied the motion and analysis at A1736 rejecting the "request [... to] 
allow amendment of [the] complaint [to] address an alleged tort based fiduciary 
duty that arose between the shareholders of this closely held corporation." A1737 
C. Statement of Facts 
This entire case was disposed of on summary judgment below. This Court 
views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to McLaughlin. GLFP, Ltd. v. CL Mgt, Ltd., 2007 UT App 131,15, 163 
P.3d 636. 
1. Cookietree, Inc. ("Cookietree") was organized under Utah law in 
1981. A1590 In 1991 Cookietree authorized 5,000,000 shares of common stock. 
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A1022; A1023 Its original shareholders were Boyd Schenk, Greg Schenk, and 
Lonnie Adams. A203; A1368 
2. In addition to owning shares, Greg Schenk has been the President and 
CEO of Cookietree at all times relevant to this proceeding. A203 The other 
Cookietree Board members were Gayle Schenk, Greg's wife, and Harold 
Rosemann, the company's chief financial officer. A1089; A1141 
3. Harold Rosemann is also a shareholder of Cookietree and has been 
since 1991. A1368 
4. In 1990 Cookietree adopted Bylaws which state in relevant part: 
a. Written or printed notice [of meetings] stating the place, 
day and hour . . . and in the case of a special meeting, the purpose or 
purposes for which the meeting is called, shall be delivered not less 
than ten (10) nor more than fifty (50) days before the meeting, either 
personally or by mai l . . . to each shareholder of meeting." A1033 
b. "Any action required to be taken at a meeting of the 
shareholders, or any other action which may be taken at a meeting of 
the shareholders, may be taken without a meeting if a consent in 
writing, setting forth the action so taken, shall be signed by all of the 
shareholders entitled to vote with respect to the subject matter 
thereof." A1036-1037 
5. On January 28, 1991 the shareholders of Cookietree, including both 
Schenks, entered into a Shareholders Agreement ("1991 Shareholders Agreement") 
which placed restrictions on the sale or transfer of Cookietree stock. A207 
Specifically, the Shareholder's Agreement provides: 
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1. No Shareholder shall sell, assign, pledge or in any manner 
transfer any shares of Cookietree Common Stock now held or 
hereafter acquired by him (the "Shares") or any right or interest 
therein, whether voluntarily or by operation of law, or by gift or 
otherwise, except by a transaction which meets the requirements 
hereinafter set forth in this Agreement. 
2. If any Shareholder desires or is required to sell any Shares, 
or if any Shares would be transferred by operation of law or 
otherwise, then the Shareholder (or his successor in interest shall first 
offer the Shares to Cookietree, by written notice to Cookietree. The 
notice shall state the number of Shares proposed to be transferred. 
4. In the event Cookietree does not elect to acquire all of the 
Shares specified in the selling Shareholder's notice, the Secretary of 
Cookietree shall, within thirty (30) days of receipt of a selling 
Shareholder's notice, give written notice thereof to the Shareholders 
other than the selling Shareholder. Said written notice shall state the 
number of Shares available for purchase (which shall be the same as 
the number contained in the selling Shareholder's notice, less the 
number of such Shares that Cookietree has elected to purchase). Each 
of the other Shareholders shall be entitled to purchase that proportion 
of the Shares available for purchase as the number of shares owned by 
each of such other Shareholders bears to the total number of Shares 
owned by all of such other Shareholders. 
11. The provisions of this Agreement may be waived with 
respect to any transfer either by Cookietree, upon duly authorized 
action of its Board of Directors, or by the Shareholders, upon the 
express written consent of the owners of at least two-thirds of the 
Shares then subject to this Agreement (excluding those Shares owned 
by the selling Shareholder). 
12. Any sale or transfer, or purported sale or transfer, of 
Cookietree Shares shall be null and void unless the terms, conditions, 
and provisions of this Agreement are strictly observed and followed. 
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13. This Agreement shall expire ten years after its effective 
dates, unless otherwise extended or earlier terminated by the parties as 
provided herein. 
A207;A208;A211 
6. On or about March 9, 1991, Boyd Schenk was issued stock certificate 
#11 representing 1,363,200 shares of Cookietree common stock. A1368 On or 
about the same date, Greg Schenk was issued stock certificate #10 representing 
1,363,200 shares of Cookietree common stock. A1368 
7. Prior to 1992, McLaughlin worked in the food industry with positions 
at Pillsbury and Quaker Oats and had 16 years experience. A266 A "head hunter" 
or executive recruiter contacted McLaughlin on behalf of Cookietree and terms of 
employment were negotiated. Id. The parties executed a written Employment 
Agreement on or about December 14, 1992. A257 
8. Cookietree and McLaughlin negotiated a reciprocal notice 
requirement should one party wish to terminate the employment relationship. 
A257;A1274 This term was material to the agreement. A1274 McLaughlin was 
contractually entitled to six-months notice of termination without cause. A259 
His employment was at-will. Id. 
9. The Employment Agreement provided McLaughlin with stock options 
allowing McLaughlin to acquire up to 200,000 shares of Cookietree common 
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stock. A258 The Employment Agreement noted that the shares "would be 
'restricted securities' . . . and subject to various restrictions on transfer." Id. 
10. McLaughlin was soon promoted to "Vice President of Operations" 
and later "Chief Operating Officer and Vice President of Operations." A267 
11. While at Cookietree, McLaughlin answered directly to Greg Schenk. 
A1277 McLaughlin never received any reprimand from Schenk nor did Schenk 
ever discuss any performance concern or alleged performance concern with 
McLaughlin. Id. Indeed, over McLaughlin's twelve years at Cookietree, 
McLaughlin and Schenk were friends. Id. Schenk was the best man at 
McLaughlin's wedding and Schenk often referred to McLaughlin as his "partner." 
Id. 
12. At all relevant times, McLaughlin was married to another Cookietree 
executive and shareholder, Kim McLaughlin. A1293 
13. Later, in 1993, Cookietree and McLaughlin entered into an Incentive 
Stock Option Agreement defining McLaughlin's option to purchase 200,000 shares 
of Cookietree common stock. This Agreement provided that "upon exercise of any 
options granted herein [McLaughlin agrees] to become a party to and execute and 
deliver to the Company the [1991 Shareholders Agreement]." This Agreement 
further provided that "[a]s a condition to the grant to [McLaughlin] of the options 
. . . [McLaughlin] agrees to execute a counterpart of and become a party to [the 
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1991 Shareholders Agreement] or any successor agreement or agreements thereto." 
A1591 
14. On or about October 19, 1995, McLaughlin was issued stock 
certificate #16 representing 2,000 shares of Cookietree common stock in partial 
exercise of his options. Certificate #16 bears a notation: 
"The shares represented by this certificate are subject to a right of first 
refusal option in favor of the corporation and certain of its 
shareholders, as provided in a Shareholders' Agreement dated January 
28th, 1991." 
A1591-1592 
15. On April 1, 1998 McLaughlin purchased 50,000 additional shares of 
Cookietree common stock and was issued stock certificate #25. Certificate #25 
bears a notation: 
"The shares represented by this certificate are subject to a right of first 
refusal option in favor of the corporation and certain of its 
shareholders, as provided in a Shareholders' Agreement dated January 
28th, 1991." 
A1592 
16. On April 1, 1998 Boyd Schenk sold his son Greg Schenk 818,000 of 
his total 1,363,200 shares. A215 Acquisition of the 818,000 shares brought 
Greg's ownership to 2,182,200 shares or 43.6 percent of the authorized shares. 
A100M002 
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17. Cookietree's Board of Directors approved these and other related 
transactions on April 1, 1998. A1592 
18. On November 28, 1998 Boyd Schenk died. Id. Boyd Schenk owned 
545,200 shares of Cookietree common stock at the time of his death which became 
part of his estate. A218 
19. It may be inferred that since Boyd Schenk transferred some, but not 
all, of his Cookietree shares to his son within months of his death, that he intended 
to keep those shares and ultimately to bequeath them to his new wife, Anna. 
20. Indeed, Boyd Schenk's will left all his property, including these 
shares, to his wife Anna Schenk. A1379 
21. Boyd Schenk's estate was probated in the State of Missouri. A1592 
22. On or about July 1, 1999 McLaughlin purchased an additional 
100,000 shares of Cookietree common stock and was issued stock certificate #28. 
This certificate bears the same restriction on transfer as McLaughlin's other 
Cookietree stock certificates. A1592-1593 
23. At the beginning of August, 1999, Cookietree had 3,328,200 shares 
outstanding of a total authorized 5,000,000 shares. A235 At that time, 
Cookietree's shareholders were: 
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a. Greg Schenk 2,181,200 
b. Jerry Smekal 519,000 
c. Harold Rosemann 316,000 
d. Sam McLaughlin 152,000 
e. Kimberly McLaughlin 150,000 
A235 The Estate of Boyd Schenk/Anna Schenk held the remaining 545,200 
shares. A218 
24. At the beginning of August, 1999 Greg Schenk owned less than half 
of the company's total authorized shares, or 2,181,200 of 5,000,000. 
25. On or about August 16, 1999, nine months after Boyd's death, his 
Estate and/or Anna Schenk sold Boyd's Cookietree shares to Greg Schenk. In 
litigation, Greg Schenk produced the cancelled share (A218), a stock power 
(A219) and a Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement (A221). 
26. Prior to litigation, the transaction had not been disclosed. The 
transaction is not mentioned or approved in the Minutes or written records of 
Cookietree for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 or 2004. A1594 
27. The 1999 transaction was conducted without following the provisions 
of the 1991 Shareholders Agreement, which, among other things, granted 
Cookietree, McLaughlin and others a first right of refusal on the shares. A207 
28. After the 1999 transaction Greg owned a total of 2,726,400 shares or 
54.5 percent of the 5,000,000 authorized shares. 
20 
29. On or about November 1, 1999 the Cookietree's Board of Directors 
approved a new Shareholders Agreement (hereinafter "the 1999 Shareholders 
Agreement"). A1076; A1082 All shareholders signed the new agreement, which 
declared "the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement... terminated and of no further force 
and effect." A1080 
30. On or about May 31, 2002, without knowledge of the 1999 
transaction, McLaughlin purchased an additional 98,000 shares of Cookietree 
common stock and was issued stock certificate #39. A1594 Certificate #39 
contained the same language and was in the same form as McLaughlin's other 
certificates. 
31. This purchase brought McLaughlin's total Cookietree stock 
ownership to 250,000 shares and his wife Kim McLaughlin's ownership to 
150,000 shares. Cookietree stock is the McLaughlin family's single biggest 
investment. A492 Cookietree dividends constitute half the McLaughlin family's 
annual income. Id. 
32. By at least 2003, Greg Schenk was verbally indicating his desire or 
willingness to sell Cookietree. A1277 
33. At or around this same time, McLaughlin discovered the Greg 
Schenk's stock transaction with Anna Schenk in 1999. A1279-1280 
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34. McLaughlin continued to negotiate with Cookietree to purchase 
Cookietree. Schenk repeatedly indicated that he would not offer McLaughlin first 
right of refusal to purchase Cookietree stock, despite the provisions in the 1991 
Shareholder Agreement. A1278 Schenk's behavior toward McLaughlin changed 
and he tried to coerce McLaughlin through thinly-veiled threats and intimidation to 
forego his rights as a shareholder and stop his efforts to purchase Cookietree. 
A1278 
35. McLaughlin announced that he was unwilling to overlook Schenk's 
and Cookietree's breaches. 
36. On or about March 21, 2003 McLaughlin gave Cookietree a letter of 
intent to purchase Cookietree for $12,000,000. A1278 McLaughlin ultimately 
was only able to raise $9,000,000 and the deal did not close. 
37. By at least January 2004 Cookietree was actively involved in 
negotiations with Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. ("Otis"), a competitor in the industry. 
Otis sought to acquire Cookietree. Otis was considered to be a strategic buyer, 
willing to pay more than the norm for a business because the new business 
enhances their current or exiting business. Al278 
38. McLaughlin, as minority shareholder, indicated his unwillingness to 
sell his shares to Otis and again demanded his right of first refusal under the 1991 
Shareholders Agreement. A1279-1280 
22 
39. Also at or around this same time, Greg Schenk became aware of 
performance issues with the vice president of sales, an individual named Mike 
Dougherty. Schenk stated he did not want to address the employment performance 
issues because "I just want to sell." A1278 
40. On or about March 30, 2004 Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. gave Cookietree a 
Letter of Intent ("LOI") to purchase Cookietree for $12,000,000 to $14,000,000. 
A1419 The structure of the March LOI was an asset sale. A1279 
41. Immediately before Greg Schenk signed the March LOI, McLaughlin 
attempted to match Otis' offer. A1279 Greg Schenk again refused to work with 
McLaughlin or grant him a few additional days to come up with a written 
commitment for financing. Id. Instead, Greg Schenk told McLaughlin "I'm going 
to sell it to Otis" and, on April 5, 2004 signed the March LOI. A1419 
42. McLaughlin still wished to compete for the purchase of Cookietree. 
Specifically: 
i. He continued to try to obtain loans and to find partners to 
meet Otis' offer; 
ii. He asserted his right of first refusal under the Shareholder 
Agreement; 
iii. He discovered and questioned the 1999 transaction with Anna 
Schenk whereby (he then believed) Greg Schenk had doubled his 
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shares5 from 1,363,200 to 2,726,400. 
A237;A1279-1280 
43. Greg Schenk persisted with his stated intent to sell the company to 
Otis, continued with various drafts of Letters of Intent with Otis over the next year 
and refused to negotiate with McLaughlin. A1279-1280; A1426; A1443; A1449; 
A1461 
44. In June, 2004, in the course and scope of negotiations for the sale of 
Cookietree, Greg Schenk asked McLaughlin in an executive meeting to sign a non-
compete agreement with Otis after the sale. McLaughlin refused. Greg Schenk 
appeared angry that McLaughlin was not willing to agree not to compete with Otis 
after the sale. Schenk said "You don't have to [sign another non-compete]. You 
already have one." A1280 
45. Thereafter, Greg Schenk began to exclude McLaughlin from 
executive meetings. A1281 
5
 Since Greg Schenk and the Board did not disclose the Anna Schenk transaction, 
the details of the transaction with Anna were not known to McLaughlin or anyone 
else in 2004. Indeed, McLaughlin's original inquiries and Complaint alleged that 
Greg Schenk unlawfully acquired 1,363,200 shares from his father's widow. See 
A6 However, during discovery, it was learned that 818,000 had been transferred 
prior to Boyd Schenk's death. The 818,000 share transaction did not violate the 
1991 Shareholder Agreement. Accordingly, McLaughlin dropped his claim to the 
818,000 shares and has since pursued his claim over the 545,200 shares which 
were transferred after Boyd's death. It is relevant, however, that this is the 
evidence McLaughlin had in 2004. A237; A1280 
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46. During the same period of time, McLaughlin asserted his contractual 
right to receive a bonus on the asset sale to Otis. A1281 As a result, Schenk 
negotiated with Otis to change the structure of the sale to a stock sale, thereby 
prohibiting McLaughlin from obtaining the bonus. Id. Indeed, the June Letter of 
Intent with Otis reflects a stock sale structure. A1426 
47. McLaughlin's attorneys sent a letter to Cookietree on July 7, 2004, 
asserting shareholder rights to purchase Cookietree and challenging the Anna 
Schenk transaction. A1433 
48. Greg Schenk promptly faxed McLaughlin's attorney's letter, as well 
as the 1991 Shareholder Agreement, to Otis. A1281-1282 
49. During the summer of 2004 McLaughlin and his "lack of cooperation 
on [the Otis] transaction was discussed" in calls between Otis, Cookietree and the 
advisor Daren Shaw. Shaw is the only member of these discussions to have 
retained and produced notes. In each of Shaw's notes, Sam McLaughlin is 
mentioned. A1282; A1401-1410 Shaw noted such things as "timing of 
approaching Sam," "buying Sam's shares," "breach of contract," "Sam six months 
notice required, salary and bonus payable." Id. 
50. On both July 29 and August 4, 2004, McLaughlin sent letters, as a 
shareholder, to the Secretary of the Board, requesting information about the Anna 
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Schenk stock transaction. A1282; A1435 McLaughlin requested to receive 
information before August 13, 2004. A1282 
51. On August 2, 2004 Otis's CEO emailed Greg Schenk and said "As we 
discussed if you make any progress with Sam and are ready to proceed please call. 
. . I will be back the 19th [of August]." A1283; A1441 
52. On August 6, 2004 the Secretary of the Board (also the CFO, a 
shareholder and an at-will employee of the company) told McLaughlin's wife (also 
the Cookietree Human Resources Director) to "tell Sam [McLaughlin] to withdraw 
his claims or there will be some organizational changes around here." A1283 
53. Meanwhile, the negotiations with Otis were being materially affected 
by McLaughlin's claims: 
i. Cookietree faxed McLaughlin's July 7 letter to Otis as soon as 
it was received; 
ii. Drafts of the Cookietree-Otis LOI contained various positions 
regarding McLaughlin and his claims: requiring Cookietree to resolve 
McLaughlin's issues, requiring McLaughlin to sign a non-compete with 
Otis and sign off on the LOI. 
iii. Otis was requiring McLaughlin's signature on a new draft 
LOI. 
A1283-1284; A1419; A1433; A1443; A1449; A1461 
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54. On August 17, 2004, McLaughlin, as shareholder, made another 
request for information regarding the Anna Schenk stock transaction. A1284; 
A1339 
55. On that same day, Schenk personally confronted and fired 
McLaughlin. A1331 McLaughlin was given a letter, stating the termination was 
"without cause." A1313 Cookietree acknowledged its contractual obligation to 
provide both payment and notice. Id. The letter said: 
Pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of your Employment Agreement 
Cookietree hereby exercises its right to terminate your employment 
without cause with six months prior written notice. Accordingly, your 
termination will be effective and the term of your Employment 
Agreement will conclude six months from your receipt of this letter. 
However, you are immediately relieved of all employment duties and 
responsibilities and will remain so relieved during the remaining 6 
month term of your Employment Agreement. During this 6 month 
period you will receive compensation as prescribed by paragraph 5(e) 
of your Employment Agreement. 
Id. (emphasis added). When McLaughlin asserted his contractual right to six 
months notice, Schenk called the police and had McLaughlin physically removed 
from the premises. A1283 Schenk directed McLaughlin's phone and email to be 
disconnected. Id. Cookietree's lawyer then called McLaughlin's lawyer and said 
"everything is negotiable; we are looking for a global resolution." Id. 
56. There was no business reason for the termination; Schenk said, "I 
don't need your services anymore." A1331 (emphasis added) 
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57. Instead of paying McLaughlin his contractual severance at 2004 
levels, Cookietree cut McLaughlin's severance pay to 1992 levels. A1285 (The 
arbitrator found this to be a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.) A1622 
58. Four business days after McLaughlin's termination, on August 23, 
2004, Otis requested that Greg Schenk again ask McLaughlin to sign a non-
compete. A1285-1286 
59. On September 7, 2004 Greg Schenk emailed his investment advisor 
and said "I'm making good progress with Sam." A1286 
60. Cookietree was presented with another form of LOI with Otis on 
September 7, 2004, 21 days after McLaughlin's termination. A1443 This LOI had 
a space for McLaughlin to sign, presumably since Greg Schenk was "making 
progress." Id. 
61. After McLaughlin refused to accept Cookietree's "terms," Schenk 
called McLaughlin's home and cell phone twelve (12) times in one day (late 
September). A1286 The final message from Schenk was "Just to let you know, 
the sale of Otis is off, since you couldn't agree to the terms . . . unless you 
reconsider." Id. 
62. Cookietree's advisor, Daren Shaw, knew of McLaughlin's termination 
and remembered in his deposition "[a]s a senior officer and as a shareholder was 
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just not being cooperative with the sale of the company" [was] "not willing to sign 
a non-compete agreement [after the sale] and was not willing to sign an offer letter 
from Otis [] that would obligate him to sell his shares." A1287 Daren Shaw 
remembers that on one occasion Greg [Schenk] mentioned . . . [McLaughlin] had 
been interested in purchasing the company himself." Id. 
63. These actions were intended to place McLaughlin in financial 
difficulty so he would give up his shareholder rights under the 1991 and 1999 
Shareholder Agreements. A1597 
64. These actions were in direct retaliation for McLaughlin's exercise of 
his shareholder rights. The termination was intended to harm McLaughlin 
economically, force him to accept the sale of Cookietree to Otis (and sign a non-
compete with them) and give up his shareholders rights, Employment Agreement 
rights and forgive Cookietree and Schenk's violations of fiduciary duty. A1597 
65. McLaughlin declined to "globally resolve" his claims and sued. Al 
66. In April 2005, Cookietree's Board of Directors, consisting of Harold 
Rosemann, Gayle Schenk and Greg Schenk held a regularly noticed and scheduled 
board meeting. A1097 Nothing about the 1999 transaction was considered or 
discussed. Id. 
67. Weeks later, in May 2005, on the advice of litigation counsel, 
Cookietree's Board of Directors held another meeting for which no notice was 
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given. The Board and each of them purported to ratify the 1999 transaction and 
waive the requirements of the 1991 Shareholder's Agreement. A227 Litigation 
counsel prepared a "Unanimous Written Consent of Directors of Cookietree, Inc. 
(Waiver of Restrictions on 1999 Transfer of Shares to Greg Schenk Effective as of 
August 14, 1999" (hereinafter "the Board Waiver"). Greg Schenk signed the 
Board Waiver. A227 
68. The Board Waiver does NOT state: 
a. The 1999 Stock transaction made Greg Schenk the majority 
shareholder of all authorized shares. 
b. Greg Schenk never disclosed the 1999 stock transaction until 
challenged by McLaughlin in 2004. 
c. Harold Rosemann was given additional Cookietree shares at the 
same time he helped facilitate the 1999 stock transaction. 
d. Other 1999 stock transactions were disclosed and approved in 
1999 Board meetings and Minutes, but the one with Anna was not. 
A1003 
69. Additionally, at the time of the May 2005 Board meeting, the 1991 
Shareholder's Agreement was no longer in force or effect. A1076; A1082 
70. In their deposition testimony, the two Schenks and Mr. Rosemann 
testified they signed the Board Waiver because "it followed Boyd Schenk's 
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wishes." None of the directors can identify a corporate purpose for the waiver and 
ratification. Rather, the motivations were characterized by self-interest, financial 
gain and retaliation against McLaughlin. A1598 
71. At the time of the Board Waiver, Boyd Schenk had been dead for six 
and one-half (6 Vi) years. A1598 
72. Directors Gayle Schenk and Greg Schenk, husband and wife, 
benefited personally from the Board Waiver. The value of 545,200 shares of 
Cookietree stock had increased over the six (6) years Greg had owned it. They 
received six years of significant corporate dividends and continue to receive 
dividends. A1598-1599 
73. Director Gayle Schenk has no other source of support apart from her 
husband, Greg. A1003 She has never voted differently than Greg in Cookietree 
Board meetings. Id. She had no qualifications to sit on the Board, other than her 
relationship to Greg. Id. Gayle was angry with McLaughlin "because he has 
challenged Greg's acquisition of Cookietree shares . . . [and] because he has sued 
Cookietree." A1003-1004 Gayle did not read the Board Waiver before she signed 
it. A1004 She did not "inquire into and understand the nature of any conflicts" 
before she signed the Board Waiver. Indeed Gayle testified that conflicts "did not 
matter to [her]." Id. Gayle believed McLaughlin was "a threat to the company" 
and that as such Cookietree had "the right to breach its contract with him." Id. at 
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pp. 52-53. Gayle knew she had a potential conflict in signing the Board Waiver 
but she signed it anyway. Id. at pp. 57-58. Gayle knew Greg had a potential 
conflict in signing the Board Waiver. Id. 
74. Two of the shareholders, notably McLaughlin and his wife, were not 
given notice of the Board meeting. A427; A1004 In fact, a Board meeting had 
been regularly noticed the month before, in April, 2005 where other corporate 
actions were ratified but the 1999 stock transaction was not mentioned. A1097 
75. In 2005 McLaughlin requested that Board Minutes be produced to 
him. A428 The Board Waiver was not disclosed or produced per this request. Id. 
It only appeared in the context of litigation. A427-428 
76. At the same time Cookietree's Board signed the Board Waiver, Greg 
Schenk contacted Cookietree shareholders individually (but not Sam and Kim 
McLaughlin) and asked them to sign a Waiver and Consent, also prepared by 
litigation counsel (hereinafter the Shareholder Waiver"). Al 103 Greg Schenk 
then signed the Shareholder Waiver himself, even though he was the subject of the 
transaction at issue. A1005 
77. Greg did not contact Sam and Kim McLaughlin about the Shareholder 
Waiver "because [he] didn't think they would sign it" nor did he give them any 
notice of a shareholder meeting. A1071-1073; compare Cookietree Bylaws, 
A1033; A1036-1037 and paragraph 4 supra. 
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78. Greg knew he had a conflict in signing the Waivers. A1072 
79. The other shareholders who signed the 2005 Waiver and Consent 
were Harold Rosemann (also a Board Member) and Jerry Smekal, a resident of 
Florida. A1103 
80. Greg Schenk called Jerry Smekal the same day he signed (May 17, 
2005) and told him McLaughlin was "contesting the transfer of the shares" and 
asked him to sign. A1073 The conversation lasted 5 minutes. Id. 
81. Greg did not read the Bylaws (requiring notice and all shareholders' 
signatures) before he asked Rosemann and Smekal to sign the Shareholder Waiver. 
A1036-1037;A1071 
82. The Waivers were litigation counsel's idea. A1071 
83. Director Harold Rosemann also had a conflicting interest in the 
transaction. He is an at-will employee of Cookietree, Inc. subject to termination if 
he does not agree with Greg Schenk. A1007 He personally was awarded the 
opportunity to buy Cookietree stock at the time of the 1999 transaction; a 
transaction in which he was necessarily complicitous as Secretary of the Board. 
A1599 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The vulnerability of minority shareholders in the closely held corporation is 
acute and well-recognized. This vulnerability is inherent in the structure of and 
relationships existing in a close corporation. Close corporations are both owned 
and managed by a small group: often friends and family. Shares in a close 
corporation are not publicly traded and no ready or fair market for them is 
available. Given its controlling interest, the majority is able to dictate to the 
minority the manner in which the corporation shall be run. However, dissention in 
a close corporation does not provide the minority with the option to sell his owner-
ship interest and leave. In fact, dissention within a company makes its shares even 
less marketable. A minority who disagrees with or challenges the decisions of the 
majority can neither profitably leave nor safely stay in the corporation. This 
dynamic leaves the minority open to various forms of oppression. As a matter of 
policy, the law should recognize a right to recovery under such circumstances. 
No Utah law defines the relationship between and among shareholders, 
officers and directors in a close corporation. By this appeal, McLaughlin urges this 
Court to adopt the standard recognized by the majority of courts and jurisdictions 
in this country who have considered the issue: the existence of a heightened 
fiduciary duty. The standard among partners in this state is one of "utmost good 
faith and loyalty." Public policy valuing and supporting small business and 
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entrepreneurship suggests the extension of such a standard to closely held 
corporations. Just as in a partnership, shareholders, officers and directors in a 
close corporation must expect trust, confidence and absolute loyalty from one 
another if the enterprise is to succeed. The majority should not be allowed to use 
position and power, or the corporation itself, to promote personal interest at the 
expense of another shareholder. 
In light of this standard of fiduciary duty, McLaughlin was not required to 
look only to his contracts, as a shareholder and an employee, as a basis of his 
fiduciary duty claim. The duty breached arose from the relationship among the 
parties and could not be compartmentalized or dissected according to the injury 
suffered. The facts in this case set forth a classic corporate freeze out, where 
McLaughlin's disfavor with the majority shareholder, CEO and President turned 
into a systematic scheme to force him to give up his shareholder rights and literally 
and physically leave the company. 
Also in this case, the corporate Board of Directors took action, post-
litigation, to "ratify" a six and one-half (6 Vi) year old stock transfer. The Board's 
action was, definitionally, a "directors conflicting interest transaction;" 
furthermore, no qualified directors existed at the time to participate in the vote. 
The ratification relied upon language in the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement 
authorizing a waiver of transfer restrictions by the Board. However, that contract 
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had been terminated by both Board and shareholder action in 1999. The 
ratification also violated the company's Bylaws which required a meeting and the 
participation of all shareholders. Since McLaughlin's rights were affected in the 
six and one-half years between the stock transfer and the "ratification" the 
ratification could not have been "valid and effective as a matter of law." 
The above actions articulated in the proposed Amended Complaint stated a 
breach of fiduciary claim for both the freeze out and the ratification conduct. 
McLaughlin should have been allowed to amend his complaint and to proceed to 
trial on his claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE MAJORITY 
POSITION AND RECOGNIZE ENHANCED FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
AMONG SHAREHOLDERS, OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS IN 
CLOSE CORPORATIONS 
A. The Current State of the Law in Utah 
This Court has noted, without specifically adopting, the definition of close 
corporations cited by Fletcher: 
(1) a small number of shareholders; 
(2) no ready market for corporate stock; and 
(3) active shareholder participation in the business. 
Dansie v. City ofHerriman, 2006 UT 23, f 17, 134 P.3d 1139 (citing Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of Private Corps. § 70.10 (perm. ed. 2002)). In 2004, in the context of 
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the dissenters' rights statute, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized a heightened 
duty to "'deal fairly and openly' with [] minority shareholders . . . when the 
majority shareholder negotiates with itself to dispose of corporate assets." 
Bingham Cons. v. Groesbeck, 2004 UT App 434, f 23, 105 P.3d 365. 
Also, in a series of cases, Utah appellate courts have considered the 
application of a so-called "close corporation exception" to the derivative action 
rule. See Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 
1998); Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 1999 UT 91, 991 P.2d 584; Dansie v. 
City ofHerriman, 2006 UT 23, 134 P.3d 1139; and GLFP, Ltd. v. CL Mgt., Ltd., 
2007 UT App 131, 163 P.3d 636. Most recently, in GLFP the Utah Court of 
Appeals questioned the viability of the exception. 2007 UT App at f 25. 
Utah has never defined the fiduciary duties among and between 
shareholders, officers and directors in a close corporation. The Utah legislature 
has not adopted the Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement or any 
variation thereof6. Arguably, in prior cases, Utah has recognized unique issues and 
6
 Only 15 state legislatures have adopted statutes responding to the particular issues 
and needs of close corporations. 
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potential for abuse with close corporations7. Notwithstanding, the extant definition 
of fiduciary duty is Utah the one applying to corporations in general; "[directors 
and officers have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corporation and its 
stockholders" and are "obliged to . . . preserve and enhance the property and 
earning power of the corporation, even if the interests of the corporation are in 
conflict with their own personal interests." Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 730 
(Utah 1982). 
Also of significance is the recent Utah Court of Appeals case of d'Elia v. 
Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, 147 P.3d 515. There, the court noted that in 
Utah fiduciary duties arise by operation of law and not necessarily from 
contractual relationship. 2006 UT App 416 at f 36. A breach of those duties 
sound in tort, not in contract. Id. "[A]n officer or director of a corporation is not 
personally liable for torts of the corporation or of its other officers and agents 
merely by virtue of holding corporate office, but can only incur personal liability 
7
 "We recognize that the rationale for requiring an action to proceed derivatively is 
often absent in a closely held corporation, where it is unlikely that there is a 
disinterested board because the majority shareholders are often the corporation's 
managers. As well 'the concept of a corporate injury that is distinct from any 
injury to the shareholders approaches the fictional in the case of a firm with only a 
handful of shareholders." Aurora Credit, 970 P.2d at 1280 (citing American Law 
Institute Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommenda-tions § 
7.01(d)). 
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by participating in the wrongful activity." Id. at % 38 (quoting Armed Forces Ins. 
Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, \ 19, 70 P.3d 35; Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private 
Corps. § 1137. 
In this appeal, McLaughlin asks the Utah Supreme Court to define the law of 
close corporations in Utah and to set forth the fiduciary duties between and among 
shareholders, officers and directors in a close corporation. Since this is an issue of 
first impression, it is appropriate to look to the law of other states for authority and 
reasoning. 
B. The Majority Position 
The majority rule among courts/jurisdictions that have considered the issue 
is that shareholders in a closely held corporation owe fiduciary duties directly to 
one another, and that a breach of these duties results in actionable conduct, 
described as minority oppression. The leading case is Donahue v. Rodd 
Electrotype Co., Inc. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). 
%See e.g. Knaebel v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 551 (Alaska 1983); River Mgt. Corp. v. 
Lodge Properties, Inc., 829 P.2d 398 (Colo. App. 1991); Battaglia v. Battaglia, 
596 N.E.2d 712 (111. App. 1992); Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. App. 
1984); Fought v. Morris, 543 So.2d 167 (Miss. 1989) (adopting Orchard v. 
Covelli, 590 F.Supp. 1548 (W.D. Penn. 1984)); Russell v. First YorkSav. Co. 352 
N.W.2d 871 (Neb. 1984) (overruled on other grounds); Van Pelt v. Greathouse, 
352 N.W.2d 871 (Neb. 1984); 68th Street Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 362 A.2d 78 
(N.J. Super. L.Div. 1976); Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 40 P.3d 449, 457 
(N.M. App. 2001); Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644 (Ohio App. 1992); A. Teixiera 
& Co., Inc. v. Tiexeira, 699 A.2d 1383 (R.I. 1997); Hall v. Tennessee Dressed Beef 
Co., 957 S.W.2d 536, 541 (Tenn. 1997). 
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In Donahue a minority shareholder applied to the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts after the trial court dismissed her fiduciary duty claim. Plaintiff 
alleged the defendants caused the corporation to purchase shares in violation of 
their fiduciary duty to her. As in this case, the trial judge dismissed the case with 
the implied finding that the transaction was in good faith. Id. at 580. 
In considering the appeal, the Donahue court first defined a close 
corporation with terms substantially identical to the ones recited by this Court in its 
Dansie opinion. Dansie, 2006 UT 23 at f 17. "As thus defined, the close 
corporation bears striking resemblance to a partnership." Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 
512. "Just as in a partnership, the relationship among the shareholders must be one 
of trust, confidence and absolute loyalty if the enterprise is to succeed." Id. The 
Donahue Court went on to note other traits inherent in the close corporation 
structure: 
Although the corporate form provides . . . advantages for the 
stockholders (limited liability, perpetuity, and so forth), it also 
supplies an opportunity for the majority stockholders to oppress or 
disadvantage minority stockholders. The minority is vulnerable to a 
variety of oppressive devices, termed 'freeze-outs,' which the 
majority may employ. An authoritative study of such 'freeze-outs' 
enumerates some of the possibilities: The squeezers [those who 
employ the freeze-out techniques] may refuse to declare dividends; 
they may drain off the corporation's earnings in the form of exorbitant 
salaries and bonuses to the majority shareholder-officers and perhaps 
to their relatives, or in the form of high rent by the corporation for 
property leased from majority shareholders; they may deprive 
minority shareholders of corporate offices and of employment by the 
company; they may cause the corporation to sell its assets at an 
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inadequate price to the minority shareholders . . . " In particular, the 
power of the board of directors, controlled by the majority, to declare 
or withhold dividends and to deny the minority employment is easily 
converted to a devise to disadvantage minority stockholders. 
Id. at 513 (citations omitted). While a minority shareholder can sue, "in practice, 
the plaintiff will find difficulty in challenging dividend or employment policies." 
Id. 
In recognition of the potential for abuse, Massachusetts held that 
"stockholders in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same 
fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one another." 
Id. at 515. That standard is one of "utmost good faith and loyalty." Id; c.f. Burke 
v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1982) ("Partners obviously occupy a 
fiduciary relationship and must deal with each other in the utmost good faith"); 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-18. "Stockholders in close corporations must discharge 
their management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict 
good faith standard. They may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest or 
in derogation of their duty to other stockholders and the corporation." Donahue, 
328 N.E.2d at 515. It is this standard that McLaughlin asks the Utah Supreme 
Court to adopt by this appeal. 
The Donahue court acknowledged that their standard is a heightened one 
and more "stringent" than the standard which applies to "directors and stockholder 
of all corporations." Id. at 515-516; compare Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 
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730 (Utah 1982). Significant policy reasons support the adoption of a heightened 
standard. 
Close corporations are distinctive entities. Traditional corporate law 
principles "derive from the view of the corporate entity as separate and distinct 
from its shareholders whose business is not conducted by its principals but by 
elected directors." 68th Street Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 362 A.2d 78, 84 (NJ. Super. 
L.Div. 1976). "[C]lose corporations consist of friends or family members where 
the directors, officers and shareholders are synonymous. Each contributes his or 
her capital, skill, experience, and labor to the company. Management and 
ownership are substantially identical. Each shareholder has an insider view of the 
company's operations and maintains an element of trust and confidence in each 
other which is commonly lacking in a large or publicly held corporation." Fought 
v. Morris, 543 So.2d 167, 171 (Miss. 1989). 
Traditional corporate principles can be inapposite and even absurd in the 
close corporation context. Utah has already noted as much: "the concept of a 
corporate injury that is distinct from any injury to the shareholders approaches the 
fictional in the case of a firm with only a handful of shareholders." Aurora Credit, 
970 P.2d at 1280-1281 (emphasis added). "It would [] be vain to attempt to 
distinguish acts done as shareholders from those done as directors, or to distinguish 
a principal's duty to serve the corporation as director from his right to protect his 
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personal interest as stockholder." 68th Street Apts., 362 A.2d at 84. Adoption of a 
partnership standard merely recognizes these realities. 
Individuals have more than one role or "hat to wear" in a close corporation 
and an individual's status cannot be singularly defined. For example, in this case 
Greg Schenk was at once a shareholder, the president of the board and the chief 
executive officer. McLaughlin was a shareholder, a vice president of operations 
and chief operating officer. "[I]t is generally understood that, in addition to 
supplying capital and labor to a contemplated enterprise and expecting a fair 
return, parties comprising the ownership of a close corporation expect to be 
actively involved in its management and operation." Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 
N.W.2d 383, 386 (N.D. 1987). It is fictional to say that Schenk was only acting as 
CEO when he fired McLaughlin and that his actions were directed only at 
McLaughlin as an employee. There is no doubt McLaughlin was terminated 
because of his actions as an owner and officer; his performance as an employee 
had never been questioned (A 1277), and Schenk was clearly disturbed by 
McLaughlin's refusal to "go along" with the sale to Otis. 
Shareholders in a close corporation are "vulnerable to a variety of oppressive 
devices." Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 40 P.3d 449,457 (N.M. App. 2001). 
A "freeze out" has been defined as "manipulative use of corporate control to 
eliminate minority shareholders or otherwise unfairly deprive them of advantages 
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or opportunities to which they are entitled." Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644, 648 
(Ohio App. 1992). An enhanced concept of fiduciary duty prohibits a majority 
shareholder from "using his power to promote his personal interests at the expense 
of corporate interests." Id. "[Oppression is usually directed at a minority 
shareholder personally, whereas fraudulent or illegal conduct can instead be 
directed at solely the shareholder's investment in the corporation." Brenner v. 
Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1028 (N.J. 1993) 
There is a ready source of precedent to help provide content to the concept 
of fiduciary duty in close corporations. The standard is, in essence, a partnership 
one which has been in existence in Utah for decades. It makes sense to "borrow 
from allied disciplines those principles and rules which seem best to comport with 
the mixed nature of the close corporation form." Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644, 
648 (Ohio App. 1992). 
The Donahue rule is not one-sided. Donahue recognized that, conversely, 
"the minority may do equal damage through unscrupulous and improper 'sharp 
dealings' with an unsuspecting majority." Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515, n. 17. 
The fiduciary duties recognized do not result from simply being the majority, but 
arise out of the nature of relationships in close corporations. The duties are 
reciprocal. Indeed, Massachusetts later held that self interest is not necessarily 
synonymous with improper motivation and held that controlling groups should be 
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allowed to demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for their actions. Wilkes v. 
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). 
A shareholder's remedy for oppression, to sell her shares, is constricted (or 
impossible) in a close corporation, almost by definition. "Restrictions on stock 
sales, transfers or encumbrances are generally the rule in close corporations. 
Limited markets exist for stock in these corporations and potential investors are 
naturally reluctant to purchase a non-controlling interest in a closely held 
corporation which has been marked by dissension and dissatisfaction." McCauley 
v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 R2d 232, 236 (N.M. 1986). It is appropriate 
that a remedy be fashioned by this court since selling on the open market is not a 
practicable one. 
The statutory remedy, dissolution, is a drastic remedy. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10a-1430; McCauley, 724 P.2d at 236 ("An order of corporate dissolution is a 
drastic remedy and should be utilized sparingly, after consideration of other 
alternative forms of relief') (citations omitted); Balvic v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d at 
388 ("[F]orced dissolution of a corporation is a drastic remedy which should be 
invoked with extreme caution and only when justice requires it"). Many courts, in 
turn, have recognized alternative equitable and legal remedies. Recognition of the 
fiduciary duty applicable to partnerships provides for a potential tort cause of 
action for breach and provides for tort (money) damages if they can be proven. 
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Close corporations, in the form of small businesses, entrepreneurial entities 
and family enterprises in this state, form a significant part of the economy. Small 
businesses provide new jobs, new inventions, economic opportunity and 
independence to individuals. The profits and strength of small business are based 
on a competitive environment. Such entities frequently "originate in the context of 
relationships personal in nature, often undertaken by family members or friends. It 
is ironic that these enterprises become a most frequent setting for the exploitation 
of minority shareholders when the personal relationship has gone sour." Orchard, 
590 F. Supp. at 1558. With its "limited ownership and a high level of mutual 
dependency [and] because it requires close cooperation in management, and 
because the majority can control corporate decision-making to the detriment of the 
minority, Courts must be prepared to fashion special relief in appropriate 
circumstances." Id. at 1559. Adoption of a duty to act in utmost good faith and 
loyalty in transacting corporate affairs serves not only to protect the participants 
but also ultimately insures the success of the entity. 
This Court has noted that "legal duty . . . is the product of policy judgments 
applied to relationships." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, f 17, 143 
P.3d 283. "A court's conclusion that duty does or does not exist is 'an expression 
of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the 
plaintiff is [or is not] entitled to protection.'" Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 2005 UT 80, 
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f 9,125 P.3d 906. Based on these statements, the realities of relationship among 
participants and the strong policies at play, this Court may comfortably define the 
legal duty among shareholders, directors and officers in a close corporation. The 
heightened fiduciary duty concept has been defined in different ways: 
"intrinsically fair9" "good faith and fair dealing10" and, in the context of oppression 
statutes, as a violation of the "reasonable expectations11" of the minority 
shareholder. McLaughlin is asking that the Utah Supreme Court adopt the "utmost 
good faith" partnership standard among shareholders in close corporations subject 
to Utah law. 
9
 Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F.Supp. 1548 (W.D. Perm. 1984); Fought v. Morris, 543 
So.2d 167 (Miss. 1989). 
10
 Fix v. Fix Material Co., Inc., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Baker v. 
Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387 (Or. 1973). 
/ ;
 Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985); Smith v. Leonard, 876 S.W.2d 
266 (Ark. 1994); Polk v. Hergert Land & Cattle Co., 5 P.3d 404 (Colo. App. 
2000); Maschmeier v. Southside Press, Ltd. 435 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa App. 1988); 
Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929 (Mont. 1982); Brenner v. Berkowitiz, 634 
A.2d 1019 (NJ. 1993); McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232 
(N.M. App. 1986); Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63 (N.Y. 1984); 
Meiselman v. Meiselmean, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983); Balvic v. Sylvester, 411 
N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987); Hendrick v. Hendrick, 755 A.2d 784 (R.I. 2000); 
Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Systems & Services, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257 (S.C. 2001); 
Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App. 1988); Masinter v. Webco, 262 
S.E.2d 433 (W.Va. 1980); Jorgenson v. Water Works., Inc. 582 N.W.2d 98 (Wis. 
App. 1998). 
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C. The Minority Position 
In their arguments below, Defendants argued the application of two main 
cases, Berman v. Physical Med. Assocs.f Ltd., 225 F.3d 429, 433 (4th Cir. 2000) 
and Riblet Products Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37 (Del. 1996). A1236; A1492 The 
Riblet plaintiff was fired from his position in a close corporation and sued in 
federal court under his employment contract. The opinion does not describe what 
facts, other than plaintiffs termination, were at issue in the breach of fiduciary 
duty claim. One must assume there were none. The Seventh Circuit certified a 
question of law to the Delaware Supreme Court asking "[w]hether majority 
shareholders in a Delaware corporation have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to a 
minority shareholder, who is also an employee under a written contract, with 
respect to issues affecting that employment." Id. at 39. The Delaware court 
interestingly restated the certified question: "[w]hether majority stockholders of a 
Delaware corporation may be held liable for violation of a fiduciary duty to a 
minority stockholder who is an employee of the corporation under an employment 
contract with respect to issues involving that employment." Id. 'The certified 
question [was] . . . answered in the negative." Id. at 40. 
In its analysis the Riblet court noted that "[t]his is not a case of breach of 
fiduciary duty to [plaintiff] qua stockholder." Id. at 40. In the second sentence of 
the opinion, Riblet noted that "the dispute arises solely with respect to th[e] 
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employment contract." Id. at 37. "Whether or not the majority stockholders may 
have breached a fiduciary duty to [plaintiff] qua stockholder or to the corporation 
is not before us." Id. Riblet is therefore distinguishable from the case at bar; here, 
the dispute was essentially a shareholder dispute and termination was used as one 
oppressive tactic of many. 
Notwithstanding the procedural and factual differences from this case, Riblet 
should still be rejected as precedent. Unlike most courts who have considered the 
issue, Riblet was unwilling to recognize that strict compartmentalization of roles in 
a close corporation is a fiction. Riblet expressly rejected the Massachusetts rule 
(Donahue/Wilkes) and stated "[t]he fact that Riblet is closely held does not, for 
this purpose, alter the duties of stockholders inter se from those which prevail for 
publicly-held corporations." Id. at 39, n.2. Delaware is in the minority on this 
issue. 
The second case Defendants relied upon is Berman v. Physical Med. Assocs., 
Ltd., 225 R3d 429 (4th Cir. 2000). Berman was a doctor, employed by a 
corporation owned and controlled by doctors. After issues arose about Berman's 
unprofessional behavior, Berman attempted to resign. The Board (the other 
doctors) met and voted to terminate him. Berman prevailed at trial on a breach of 
employment agreement claim. Berman also claimed that "he was owed a fiduciary 
duty and that the directors, in terminating his employment, breached this duty by 
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failing to follow fair and established corporate procedures." Id. at 433. The Fourth 
Circuit expressly did not reach the question at issue in this appeal: do the fiduciary 
dutfies] of a director in a close corporation run[] to stockholders individually, as 
well as to stockholders as a class..." Id. The case was resolved on different 
grounds; namely, that Berman's "status as a stockholder" was not "implicated," 
only his status as an employee. Id. 
Berman, therefore, is ultimately distinguishable procedurally and on its 
facts. Procedurally, the Fourth Circuit did not reach the question, finding that 
Berman did not allege any of "the rights available to him as a stockholder" had 
"been denied." Id. This differs from the McLaughlin case because McLaughlin 
alleged that many of his rights as a shareholder were denied to him {e.g. the right 
to disclosure, access to information, the right to purchase a pro rata share of the 
Anna Schenk stock in 1999, the right of first refusal to purchase Cookietree stock 
in 2004). McLaughlin alleges that one of the ways Defendants froze him out and 
took retaliatory action for the assertion of these rights was to fire him. 
Significantly, employment termination was only one among many items of 
damages McLaughlin alleged as a shareholder: he was denied the opportunity to 
own additional shares in 1999, denied the benefit of the appreciated value of the 
shares 1999-2007, the dividends on the shares 1999-2007, denied the opportunity 
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to purchase Cookietree in 2004, suffered lost wages, lost income and economic 
loss from being frozen out of the company and put on the street and may be 
entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs. 
By this appeal, McLaughlin asks the Utah Supreme Court to look not to the 
source of the injury (qua shareholder, qua employee) but to the source of the duty. 
Prior Utah law certainly provides a sound foundation for such an approach. D'Elia 
at f 36. 
In the court below, the judge reasoned that since the Otis transaction never 
closed there could be no damage: 
To the extent the breach of fiduciary duty claim relates to the 
proposed sale to Otis Spunkmeyer, the sale never occurred and there 
is absolutely no evidence of any damage that plaintiff incurred as a 
result of the activities surrounding the non-existent sale. 
A1508 McLaughlin's argument was misunderstood. Although under the 1991 
Shareholder's Agreement McLaughlin had a first right of refusal to purchase 
Cookietree shares, Schenk flatly refused to negotiate with McLaughlin in 2004 or 
extend him additional days to obtain financial backing. A1279 Schenk made 
clear: "I'm going to sell it to Otis." A1419 Schenk's personal economic incentive 
to breach the 1991 Shareholder's Agreement in this regard is clear: Otis was a so-
called "strategic buyer" and was willing to pay more. McLaughlin asserted his 
rights, made written requests for information (from legal counsel and personally) 
and pursued the issue. Not only did Schenk deprive McLaughlin of his rights and 
the potential in 2004 , but he froze McLaughlin out and retaliated against him for 
the attempt. Stated thusly, it is not material that the Otis transaction did not close. 
The existence of a strategic buyer and all the LOIs structured around McLaughlin 
provide a motive and context for Schenk's actions. 
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D, McLaughlin's Request for Relief 
McLaughlin respectfully summarizes his request of this Court below on this 
issue of first impression. 
1. Definition for Close Corporations and Adoption of 
the Partnership Standard 
This Court should specifically adopt the definition of "close corporations" 
recited in its Dansie opinion: 
(4) a small number of shareholders; 
(5) no ready market for corporate stock; and 
(6) active shareholder participation in the business. 
Dansie, 2006 UT 23 at f 17. In so doing, it should also be noted that a close 
corporation is more like a partnership than a corporation. This Court should adopt 
the "utmost good faith and loyalty" standard of fiduciary duty among shareholders. 
This is identical to the partnership standard in Utah. Burke v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 
1015, 1017 (Utah 1982) ("Partners obviously occupy a fiduciary relationship and 
must deal with each other in the utmost good faith."); Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-18. 
This court should also specifically follow Donahue and its progeny, rejecting the 
minority position represented by Riblet and Berman. "[MJajority shareholders and 
directors in close corporations" "are required to exercise their utmost good faith 
and cannot use their corporate power in bad faith or for their individual 
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advantage." River Mgt. Corp. v. Lodge Properties, Inc., 829 P.2d 398, 401 (Colo. 
App. 1991); see also Masinterv. Webco, 262 S.E.2d 433 (W.Va. 1980) 
(stockholders, officers and directors owe the duty to the minority). 
2. The Duty Arises From Operation of Law, not 
Contract 
Consistent with the Utah Court of Appeals' statements in d'Elia v. Rice Dev. 
Inc., 2006 UT App 416,147 P.3d 515, this Court should specifically recognize that 
the fiduciary duties among shareholders in close corporations arise by operation of 
law independent of contractual relationships that may or may not exist. 2006 UT 
App 416 at f 36. A breach of those duties sound in tort, not in contract. Id. Tort 
damages, including punitive damages may be recoverable. 
3. One May Incur Personal Liability for Breach 
D'Elia found that officers and directors "may incur personal liability by 
participating in the wrongful activity." Id. at f 38 Consistent with this reality, the 
Utah Supreme Court should rule that "[a] transaction whereby an officer or 
director uses his position with the corporation, uses the corporation, or uses 
corporate funds for the purpose of promoting his personal interest at the expense of 
another shareholder may be the basis for a cause of action against the officer or 
director." Hall v. Tennessee Dressed Beef Co., 957 S.W.2d 536, 541 (Term. 1997). 
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E. The Trial Court's Errors 
The trial court made several errors in its ruling. The decision found that "all 
of the causes of action in [the employment action, including, by implication the 
breach of fiduciary duty claim against Greg Schenk individually] arose from the 
employment relationship." A1506 The ruling stated that "[f|or a fiduciary duty 
claim to be present in this case, plaintiff would need to identify a duty, breach and 
damages, separate from any of the contractual obligations that existed between the 
parties." A1508-1509 This was error since the duties among the parties arose by 
operation of law and not solely by contract. 
The trial court further found that Greg "Schenk did not owe any fiduciary 
duty to Mr. McLaughlin that applies to the dealings related to Mr. McLaughlin in 
his role as an employee." Id. In Utah, it is appropriate to look to the source of the 
duty not to the source of the injury. An act of employment termination may very 
well violate the law (i.e. racial discrimination) or a contract of employment and at 
the same time be an act of oppression. To look only to the type of injury ignores 
the significance of the duty. 
The trial court found that Cookietree, not Greg Schenk, fired McLaughlin. 
In close corporations, "[i]t would [] be vain to attempt to distinguish acts done as 
shareholders from those done as directors, or to distinguish a principal's duty to 
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serve the corporation as director from his right to protect his personal interest as 
stockholder." 68th Street Apts., 362 A.2d at 84. 
The trial court found that Schenk's "role as officer of the [close] corporation 
d[id] not create any new fiduciary relationship to Mr. McLaughlin." A1506-1607 
In close corporations, these duties are owed to the minority by officers, directors 
and stockholders. Masinter, 262 S.E.2d at 247. 
F. Defendants Breached their Fiduciary Duty to McLaughlin 
In the court below, the Defendants successfully convinced the judge that this 
case could be compartmentalized according to the contractual duties at play: stock 
and employment. The employment claims arising under that contract were 
referred to arbitration. The stock claims were dismissed in large part due to the 
Waivers procured in 2005. See Argument II, supra. Because the case was 
bifurcated and then analyzed narrowly according to contract, the heart of 
McLaughlin's case — the freeze out - was never considered. 
1. Duty 
Definitionally Cookietree is a close corporation. Through Schenk's and 
Rosemann's control of management, the board and stock, they controlled the 
corporation. Schenk and Rosemann had a fiduciary duty to McLaughlin that arose 
because of their relationship as shareholders/management in a close corporation. 
This duty arose through operation of law, not by virtue of any of the contracts 
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between McLaughlin and the corporation. This duty was one of "utmost good 
faith and loyalty." Schenk and Rosemann could "not act out of avarice, 
expediency or self-interest or in derogation of their duty to other stockholders and 
the corporation." Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515. 
McLaughlin tried to exercise his right of first refusal to buy Cookietree 
stock. He questioned Schenk's secret acquisition of stock in 1999 from his father's 
widow. If the 1999 transaction were unwound, McLaughlin would have had the 
opportunity to acquire additional shares. McLaughlin requested documents. He 
refused to sign LOIs and new non-compete agreements with the strategic buyer. 
Schenk and Rosemann could not, through the "manipulative use of corporate 
control... eliminate minority shareholders or otherwise unfairly deprive them of 
advantages or opportunities to which they are entitled." Gigax v. Repka, 615 
N.E.2d 644, 648 (Ohio App. 1992). Schenk and Rosemann could not use their 
power to promote "personal interests at the expense of corporate interests." Id. 
2. Breach 
Defendants ignored and breached this duty all along. In 1999 they 
conducted a secret stock transaction for the benefit and gain of one shareholder — 
and the detriment of and loss to other shareholders. Additional stock was awarded 
to the Secretary of the Board, who facilitated the transfer, at the same time. See 
Statement of Facts, infra, at f 83. The transaction was also not disclosed. Id. at 26. 
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Schenk refused to honor McLaughlin's first right of refusal to purchase, or even 
negotiate to purchase, the corporation in 2003-2004. Id. at fi 34-41. When 
questioned, Schenk felt threatened and therefore refused to provide documents or 
information. Id. SchenkshutMcLaughlinoutof participation in the business. Id. 
at 145. 
In 2004 Defendants conspired with their financial consultant and the 
strategic buyer to put pressure on McLaughlin. Id. at f 49. They needed 
McLaughlin to give up his issues and rights and cooperate. Id. at f 44. Knowing 
McLaughlin and his family situation intimately, Schenk decided to put 
McLaughlin in a position of economic hardship so he would have no choice but to 
accede. Id. at f l 52, 55. 
McLaughlin's employment was the first domino to kick over. Id. at f 55. 
No reason or business purpose existed for termination, but McLaughlin was an at-
will employee. Id. atf 56. McLaughlin's contractual severance was reduced, in 
bad faith, and contrary to prior practice, to 1992 levels. Id. at f 57. McLaughlin 
was escorted from company property by law enforcement, based upon an 
unsubstantiated allegation of trespass. Id. at % 55. Defendants refused to give 
employment references so that McLaughlin could not obtain other employment. 
After being put on the street, McLaughlin was strategically approached for a 
"global resolution" and presented with the new LOI, a non-compete and a 
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settlement agreement. Id. at f 60. Schenk called McLaughlin repeatedly; once 12 
times in one day. Id. at f 61. Schenk tried to use the employment termination as 
leverage in negotiating with McLaughlin over the stock sale. Id. at f 55. 
Defendants also found it necessary to cure the problems with the stock 
transaction accomplished and hidden back in 1999. Id. at f 67. The contract 
authorizing waiver of the transfer restrictions had been terminated. Id. at f 29. 
Although everyone had a conflicting interest and no one was "qualified", the Board 
still voted to ratify the transfer ex post facto. Id. at f 67. Shareholders, consisting 
mainly of Greg Schenk and Harold Rosemann, also signed a Waiver. Id. at <J[ 76. 
The shareholders who were alleging damage from the transaction, the 
McLaughlins, were not even approached, notified of a vote or asked to participate. 
Id. at f 11. Conflicts, interest, company bylaws and the nullified contract were 
ignored. Id. at fj[ 73, 77, 78. In the end, Schenk and Rosemann obtained 
additional shares and McLaughlin did not. Id. at ffl 25, 83. 
"It would [] be vain to attempt to distinguish acts done as shareholders 
from those done as directors, or to distinguish a principal's duty to serve the 
corporation as director from his right to protect his personal interest as 
stockholder." 68th Street Apts., 362 A.2d at 84. Defendants committed these acts 
of breach, not in any particular role and not directed at McLaughlin in any 
particular role. They committed them, they participated personally in them, and 
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they are liable individually for those acts. D'Elia, 2006 UT App 416 at f 38. "A 
transaction whereby an officer or director uses his position with the corporation, 
uses the corporation, or uses corporate funds for the purpose of promoting his 
personal interest at the expense of another shareholder may be the basis for a cause 
of action against the officer or director." Hall, 957 S.W.2d at 541 (emphasis 
added). 
3. Damage 
Under the Shareholder's Agreement, McLaughlin was entitled to a right of 
refusal for acquiring the shares. Schenk's 1999 behavior and the Board's self-
interested 2005 behavior have prevented this. McLaughlin was contractually 
entitled to acquire a percentage of the transferred shares in 1999 but that right was 
thwarted by an after-the-fact ratification, engineered by litigation counsel years 
after the transaction. Cookietree's profitability and share value have increased 
significantly since 1999. McLaughlin has lost not only the opportunity to own the 
shares, but the increase in value in those shares over eight (8) years. The dividends 
McLaughlin could have received during the years 1999-2007 from those 
wrongfully denied shares are significant. 
As further items of damage, McLaughlin was frozen out of the company, 
terminated, had his severance cut and was frozen out without notice, resulting in 
lost wages and income. These actions were taken in direct retaliation for his 
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challenge of the 1999 transaction and are damages flowing from the breaches of 
fiduciary duty. Punitive damages are also available in a breach of fiduciary duty 
case. 
This matter should be remanded to the court based upon the Utah Supreme 
Court's articulation of a heightened fiduciary duty to allow McLaughlin to proceed 
on his claims. 
II. MCLAUGHLIN SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND 
HIS COMPLAINT 
The trial court denied McLaughlin's request to amend his complaint to add 
parties and causes of action. A1571; A1574; A1735 McLaughlin submitted a 
proposed form of complaint which set forth his fiduciary claim. A1587 
Previously, that claim had been pled in three complaints, in the stock action, the 
employment action and the derivative action. A12; B9; C35 
The trial court had challenged McLaughlin to identify a "duty, breach and 
damages, separate from any of the contractual obligations that existed between the 
parties." A1508-1509 McLaughlin did this as demonstrated above at pp. 55 - 60 
and below at A1574. In light of the Utah Court of Appeals' statements in d'Elia 
that fiduciary duties arise by operation of law and not necessarily from contractual 
relationship the court was wrong in looking narrowly at fiduciary duty as flowing 
from contract. D'Elia, 2006 UT App 416 at f 36. A breach of fiduciary duties 
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sound in tort, not in contract. Id. They can exist in the presence of a contract 
between the parties and also in the absence of one. The trial court clearly erred in 
looking for fiduciary duty only in the contracts among the parties. As a result, it 
was an abuse of discretion for McLaughlin's motion to amend complaint to add 
parties and causes of action to be denied. 
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED GIVEN 
THE EXISTENCE OF FACTUAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE 
2005 "RATIFICATION" BY THE COOKIETREE BOARD AND 
SOME OF ITS SHAREHOLDERS 
One of the disagreements between Schenk and McLaughlin in 2003 and 
2004 was Schenk's acquisition of stock from his father's widow, Anna Schenk. 
The stock action alleged breach of contract (A8) and breach of fiduciary duty 
(A 12). In an after-the-fact attempt to legitimize the acts complained about in 
McLaughlin's Complaint, litigation counsel procured "waivers" from Cookietree's 
Board of Directors and some of its shareholders. A227; A230 Defendants then 
brought a motion for summary judgment claiming the stock transaction in question 
had been "ratified." A189 
McLaughlin objected to the Waivers and opposed summary judgment on 
several bases. Namely, 
13
 Just because McLaughlin was an at-will employee does not mean his termination 
could not have been an item of damage in the course and scope of a breach of 
fiduciary duty. As demonstrated herein, McLaughlin's employment was a wedge 
and a tool used by the oppressive majority to deprive McLaughlin of rights to 
which he was entitled. 
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a. the ratification was invalid because the Shareholder Agreement 
from which it derived authority was expired and expressly nullified; 
b. the ratification was invalid because it was a conflicting interest 
transaction; 
c. the ratification and waiver violated Cookietree bylaws; and 
d. the ratification and waiver was untimely, or there was a 
question of fact as to timeliness. 
A993 Even though he found Schenk and the other actors to be "self dealing" and 
"un-American14" the trial judge granted summary judgment and found the Board 
Waiver and Shareholder Waivers "effective as a matter of law." McLaughlin 
asked for clarification and for an analysis accepting or rejecting each of his 
substantive defenses (A 1513) but none was forthcoming. A1735 
A. The 1991 Shareholders' Agreement was Expired and 
Expressly Nullified; Therefore No Authority Could Have 
Existed for the Waivers 
Interpretation of contract terms is a question of law and legal conclusions are 
reviewed for correctness. Canyon Meadows Home Owners Ass'n v. Wasatch 
County, 2001 UT App 414, f 7,40 P.3d 1148. The facts, however, must be viewed 
in a light most favorable to McLaughlin, as the claims were dismissed on summary 
judgment. GLFP, 2007 UT App 131 at 15. 
14A1753atp.27. 
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From 1991 - 1999 Cookietree shares were subject to a 1991 Shareholder's 
Agreement dated January 28, 1991. A207 The 1991 Shareholder's Agreement 
provided that: -
-* - if a shareholder wished to sell his/her shares, those shares had to be 
offered first to Cookietree and then to the other shareholders, pro rata; Id. at f 2 
* Boyd Schenk was allowed to transfer shares to his wife or son during 
his life or by his will without first offering them as set forth in paragraph (a); Id. at 
19 
* Any transferees of stock were subject to the share restrictions; Id. 
The secret transaction that secured Greg Schenk's ownership of 54.5% of all 
Cookietree shares occurred on August 16, 1999. On November 1, 1999 the 
Cookietree's Board of Directors approved a new Shareholders Agreement 
(hereinafter "the 1999 Shareholders Agreement"). A1076; A1082 All 
shareholders signed the new agreement, which declared "the 1991 Shareholders' 
Agreement. . . terminated and of no further force and effect." A1080 (emphasis 
added). At the time the Board and shareholders terminated the 1991 Shareholders' 
Agreement, the 545,200 share transaction was still secret. 
The Waivers derive authority from that 1991 Shareholder's Agreement, 
111. At the time the Waivers were procured, then, the 1991 Shareholder's 
Agreement had been "terminated." A1076; A1080 To be valid, any waiver must 
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have been procured before November 1, 1999, the date the Shareholder's 
Agreement was nullified. This was a period of time, however, when Greg Schenk 
was still concealing the stock transaction. As a matter of plain contract . ~ 
interpretation, therefore, the Waivers were procured under authority of a voided 
contractual provision and could not have been "effective as a mater of law." The 
trial court plainly erred in failing to so hold. 
B. The Waivers Were Conflicting Interest Transactions as 
Defined by Statute 
As an alternative objection, McLaughlin demonstrated that the Waivers were 
conflicting interest transactions. A1007 Since the trial court upheld the legal 
validity of the Waivers, it must have rejected this argument. This Court reviews 
questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the 
district court's legal conclusions. Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 
518,519 (Utah 1997). 
The Utah Revised Business Corporation Act defines a director's conflicting 
interest transaction and sets forth a procedure for enjoining, setting aside or 
sanctioning the same. Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-850 - 853. A director's 
conflicting interest transaction is "a transaction effected or proposed to be effected 
by the corporation, or by any entity controlled by the corporation respecting which 
a director has a conflicting interest." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-850(2). There is 
no case law in Utah interpreting these provisions and McLaughlin asks this Court 
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to rely on the plain statutory language, with no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions. 
The "transaction" effected is the 2005 ratification15. The document is signed 
by Greg Schenk, Gayle Schenk and Harold Rosemann. A227 None were 
qualified directors and each had a conflict. The application of the code with 
respect to each signatory is discussed below. 
1. Greg Schenk's Conflict and Interest 
In early August 1999 Greg Schenk held 2,181,200 shares. A218 Five 
million (5,000,000) shares were authorized. A235 Boyd Schenk died and left his 
Cookietree shares to his new wife of six-months. A1379 In a private transaction 
on August 16, 1999, Schenk acquired those shares without them first being offered 
to the company and other shareholders pro rata as required by the then-existing 
Shareholders' Agreement. The transaction secured Greg Schenk's ownership of a 
majority of the authorized shares. See p. 20, supra. The transaction was not 
mentioned in any Board minutes in 1999 or in the six years that followed. A1594 
In the proceedings below, Defendants argued that the "transaction" was the 1999 
stock transfer between Greg Schenk and Anna Schenk. Al 180 This confusion 
may have contributed to the trial court's erroneous ruling. Indeed, the "transaction 
. . . to be effected by the corporation" was the ex post facto ratification of the 
transfer six and one-half years later, after McLaughlin's shareholder rights had 
been trampled, after the secret was exposed, after McLaughlin had asserted his 
rights and suffered retaliation for it and after the commencement of litigation. The 
attempt at ratification was certainly an act "of the corporation." 
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Litigation counsel recommended that the Board ratify the transaction after 
litigation was initiated. As a matter of law, the 2005 Board Waiver was a 
"director's conflicting interest transaction:" it was "a transaction effected or 
proposed to be effected by the corporation" . . . "respecting which a director has a 
conflict of interest." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-850(2). Schenk had a "conflicting 
interest" because the 1999 stock transfer being ratified was one in which Schenk 
had a "beneficial interest" and was "so financially significant to the director that 
the interest would reasonably be expected to exert an influence on the director's 
judgment." Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-850(l)(a). The transfer being ratified was 
the one shoring up Schenk's majority control. 
Greg Schenk benefited personally from the Board Waiver. The value of the 
545,200 shares of surreptitiously obtained Cookietree stock had increased over the 
six (6) years Greg had owned it. He has received six years of significant corporate 
dividends and continues to receive dividends. A1598-1599 He will continue to do 
so until his shares are sold, and presumably then he will receive another unjustified 
and illegal windfall. 
2. Gayle Schenk's Conflict and Interest 
Gayle Schenk, wife of Greg Schenk, was the second Board member to sign 
the Board Waiver. She, too, had a "conflicting interest" because she was a "related 
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person" to Greg Schenk, holder of the "beneficial interest" and one to whom the 
ratification was so "financially significant." 
Gayle gave telling deposition testimony on these points. She has no source 
of support apart from her husband, Greg. A1003 She has never voted differently 
than Greg in Cookietree Board meetings. Id. She had no qualifications to sit on 
the Board, other than her relationship to Greg. Id. Gayle was angry with 
McLaughlin "because he has challenged Greg's acquisition of Cookietree shares 
. . . [and] because he has sued Cookietree." A1003-1004 Gayle did not read the 
Board Waiver before she signed it. A1004 She did not "inquire into and 
understand the nature of any conflicts" before she signed the Board Waiver. Gayle 
testified that conflicts "did not matter to [her]." Id. Gayle believed McLaughlin 
was "a threat to the company" and that as such Cookietree had "the right to breach 
its contract with him." Id. at pp. 52-53. Gayle knew she had a potential conflict in 
signing the Board Waiver but she signed it anyway. Id. at pp. 57-58. Gayle knew 
Greg had a potential conflict in signing the Board Waiver. Id. 
Even if she had not impeached herself, Gayle, with a "familial" and a 
"financial" relationship with a director who had a conflict of interest, could not be 
a "qualified director." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-850(3). 
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3. Harold Rosemann's Conflict and Interest 
The third Board member to sign the 2005 Board Waiver was Harold 
Rosemann, the company's CFO and a shareholder. He is an at-will employee of 
Cookietree, Inc. subject to termination if he does not agree with Greg Schenk. 
A1007 He personally was awarded the opportunity to buy Cookietree stock at the 
time of the secret 1999 stock transaction; a transaction in which he was necessarily 
complicitous as Secretary of the Board. A1599 Definitionally, Rosemann could 
not have been a "qualified director" because he has an "employment relationship 
with a second director who does have a conflicting interest." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10a-850(3). 
4. No Safe Harbor 
A director's conflicting interest transaction can be legitimatized if it falls 
within a safe harbor provision created by statute. The first of these is the directors' 
action. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-852. No directors' action could be effectuated 
under the statute since no "qualified directors" existed and a vote of "qualified 
directors" is required. Id. 
The second of the safe harbors attempted by Cookietree was shareholders' 
action. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-853. Shareholders' action is effective: (1) if a 
quorum existed; and (2) a majority of the votes entitled to be cast by qualified 
shares present in person or in proxy at the meeting were cast in favor of the 
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transaction; (3) the vote was cast after notice to shareholders describing the 
director's conflicting interest transaction, provision of information and disclosure 
to the shareholders. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-853. 
First, no quorum existed. A quorum requires a "majority of the votes 
entitled to be cast by the holders of all qualified shares/' Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10a-853(2) (emphasis added). Sam and Kim McLaughlin held qualified 
shares but were not included in the vote. Non-qualified shares, namely Greg 
Schenk's shares, were included in the vote. Second, there was no meeting and the 
vote was conducted in a manner designed to freeze out certain of the shareholders. 
Jerry Smekal signed after a 5-minute phone conversation with Greg Schenk. The 
McLaughlins were not contacted at all. 
Lastly, the required information and disclosures were not made. Preparing 
the Waivers, Defendants did not disclose several material facts: 
* The 1999 Stock transaction made Greg Schenk the majority 
shareholder of all authorized shares. 
* Greg Schenk never disclosed the 1999 stock transaction until 
challenged by McLaughlin in 2004. 
* Harold Rosemann was given additional Cookietree shares at the same 
time he helped facilitate the 1999 stock transaction. 
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* Other 1999 stock transactions were disclosed and approved in 1999 
Board meetings and Minutes, but the one with Anna was not. 
A1003 The shareholders' action statute requires disclosure of "all facts known to 
the director respecting the subject matter of the transaction that an ordinarily 
prudent person would reasonably believe to be material." Id.; Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10a-850(4)(b). "Thus, it is absolutely essential to the validity of a ratification 
by the shareholders of such a voidable contract that it be made with full knowledge 
on the part of the shareholders of the terms of the contract and of the directors' 
interest. Want of such knowledge renders void a vote of ratification." Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of Private Corps. § 984. "Ratification may be proved by showing that 
all the shareholders of a corporation had knowledge . . . " Whittier v. Harold 
Austin Const., Inc., 935 S.W. 2d 579, 583 (Ark. App. 1996). "Whether 
shareholders are fully informed turns upon whether directors have complied with 
their duty to disclose all material information when seeking affirmative votes of 
shareholders." Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1128 (Del. 1999). As set 
forth above, material information was withheld. 
The conflicting interest transaction does not fit in to any of the safe harbor 
exceptions. The trial court should not have ignored the existence of the conflict of 
interest and granted summary judgment. 
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C. The Waivers Violated Cookietree Bylaws 
Not only did the safe harbor statute require a meeting, so did Cookietree 
Bylaws. Duly adopted bylaws are a contract between the corporation and its 
shareholders and must be observed. Hall, 957 S.W.2d at 539. Greg Schenk did 
not bother to consult the Bylaws prior to procuring the May 2005 Waivers. 
A1036-1037; A1071 Cookietree Bylaws require notice for shareholder meetings. 
A1933 Because they were no more than post-litigation posturing, the May 2005 
Waivers were obtained without notice and without a meeting. The Bylaws further 
require that action taken without a meeting "shall be signed by all of the 
shareholders entitled to vote with respect to the subject matter thereof." A1037-
1037 Sam and Kim McLaughlin were frozen out and not asked to sign. The 
Bylaws were not followed, rendering the attempted "waiver" void. "To suggest 
that a corporation has no legal duty to follow its own bylaws would be to reduce 
the bylaws to meaningless mounting of words." Hall, 957 S.W.2d at 539. 
D. The Waivers were Untimely, or There was a Question of Fact as 
to Timeliness. 
Even if the ratification were deemed to have occurred, McLaughlin is 
entitled to have the issue of its timeliness decided by a jury. The six and one-half 
year ex post facto ratification could not possibly have been "timely as a matter of 
law." "The question of whether the board of directors should be deemed to have 
ratified the agreement on behalf of the corporation depends on questions of fact 
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and inference to be drawn therefrom." Lake Creek Irrigation Co. v. Clyde, 451 
P.2d 375, 377 (Utah 1969) (citing Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corps. § 781). 
Because so much time passed between the date of the transfer and the 
alleged ratification, the delay created an unfair and disadvantageous result for 
McLaughlin. He took a stand, Schenk took retaliatory action and McLaughlin was 
forced to sue to enforce his rights. u[T]he rights of a third person have intervened . 
. . in such a case it would be unjust to allow the principal to ratify the act of the 
agent at a later date if beneficial to it, or to repudiate it if it proved detrimental to 
its interest. In such a situation, a subsequent ratification of an act performed by an 
unauthorized agent is not valid." U.S. v. 40,438 Square Feet of Land in Boston, 66 
F.Supp. 659, 663 (D. Mass. 1946) (citing Mechem on Agency § 528, Story on 
Agency §§ 246, 247). The trial court erred in implicitly finding as a matter of law 
that the alleged ratification was timely. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
By this appeal, McLaughlin asks the Utah Supreme Court to set forth the 
standard for fiduciary duty among shareholders in a close corporation. 
McLaughlin asks that the partnership standard of "utmost good faith and loyalty" 
be applied to members of a close corporation and that this Court specifically adopt 
and approve Donahue and its progeny. Judge Hilder's Rulings and Orders dated 
4/26/07 and 8/6/07 should be REVERSED and the case remanded for further 
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proceedings consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's statements of law on 
fiduciary duty. This case should be remanded to allow McLaughlin to amend his 
complaint to articulate a fiduciary duty claim which arises by operation of law and 
from the relationship of these parties as partners in a close corporation. 
McLaughlin further requests that this Court find, as a matter of law, that the 
attempted ratification in 2005 was not effective or valid. The contractual authority 
under which the Waivers were drafted had long been terminated by Board and 
shareholder vote. The Waivers were conflicting interest transactions under the 
statute. Given intervening events and the lengthy passage of time between the 
1999 secret stock transfer and the 2005 Waivers, there was at minimum a question 
of fact as to the timeliness of the purported ratification. On remand, McLaughlin 
should be allowed to pursue his breach of contract and breach of covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing claims with respect to Defendants' 1999 conduct in 
transferring stock outside the express terms of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement. 
DATED this 20th day of November, 2007. 
MARGARET H. OLSON, Of Counsel 
LINCOLN W. HOBBS 
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant were hand delivered to the following: 
Matthew M. Durham 
Justin E. Palmer 
STOEL RIVES, L.L.P. 
201 South Main Street, #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Richard D. Flint 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
299 South Main Street, #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
and an original and nine copies were filed with the clerk of the appellate court. 
DATED this 20th day of November, 2007. 
MARGARET H. OLSON, Of Counsel 
LINCOLN W. HOBBS 
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Board Waiver (A227-228) 
Shareholder Waiver (A230-233) 
04/26/07 Ruling and Order (A1504-1512) 
08/06/07 Ruling and Order (A1735-1738) 
(Proposed) Second Amended Complaint (A1587-1603) 
Tabl 
UNANIMOUS WRITTEN CONSENT OF DIRECTORS 
OF 
COOKIETREE, INC. 
(Waiver of Restrictions on 1999 Transfer of Shares to Greg Schenk) 
Effective as of August 15,1999 
On the dates indicated next to each director's signature below, the undersigned, being all 
of the directors of Cookietree, Inc., a Utah corporation (the "Company"), hereby adopt the 
following resolutions by unanimous written consent without a meeting pursuant to Section 821 
of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act (the "Act") to be effective as of August 15, 1999: 
WHEREAS the Company is a party to that certain Shareholders' Agreement dated as of 
January 28,1991 among the Company and certain shareholders of Cookietree (the "1991 
Shareholders Agreement"). 
WHEREAS pursuant to that certain Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement dated August 
16,1999 between the estate of Boyd F. Schenk and Greg F. Schenk, the estate of Boyd F. 
Schenk transferred 545,200 shares of common stock of the Company ("Shares") to Greg F. 
Schenk (the "1999 Transfer"). 
WHEREAS pursuant to Section 11 of the Shareholders Agreement, the directors desire to 
cause the Company to consent to the waiver of all restrictions (except the restriction contained in 
Section 10 of the Shareholders Agreement) on transfer in the Shareholders Agreement relating to 
the transfer or sale to Greg Schenk of the Shares transferred in the 1999 Transfer. 
WHEREAS some of the directors have interests in the 1999 Transfer, and as a result, the 
1999 Transfer may be deemed a "conflicting interest transaction" under Section 850 of the Act, 
and the potentially conflicted directors desire to disclose their interests to the board of directors. 
WHEREAS the interests that may cause some directors to be potentially conflicted 
directors include the following: 
Director Potential Interest in Transactions 
Greg Schenk In the 1999 Transfer, Boyd F. Schenk, Greg Schenk's father, 
transferred to Greg Schenk 545,200 Shares. Greg Schenk is the 
president of the Company. 
Gayle Schenk Gayle Schenk is the wife of Greg Schenk. See potential interest in 
transactions for Greg Schenk above. 
Harold Rosemann Harold Rosemann is the secretary and treasurer of the Company. 
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WHEREAS having been apprised of the interests of the potentially conflicted directors 
and having had a frill opportunity to inquire into and understand the extent and nature of those 
interests, the board of directors of the Company desires to waive any restrictions relating to the 
transfer or sale to Greg Schenk of the Shares transferred in the 1999 Transfer. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the directors hereby determine that it is in 
the best interest of the Company and its shareholders for the Company to waive any restrictions 
relating to the transfer or sale to Greg Schenk of the Shares transferred in the 1999 Transfer; 
RESOLVED FURTHER that, pursuant to Section 11 of the Shareholders Agreement, the 
Company hereby waives and consents to the waiver of the provisions of the Shareholders 
Agreement (except the restriction contained in Section 10 of the Shareholders Agreement) 
relating to any transfer or sale (whether made in the past or to be made in the future) to Greg 
Schenk of the Shares transferred in the 1999 Transfer. Without limiting the generality of the 
prior sentence, the Company hereby consents to the waiver of all restrictions on transfer 
contained in the Shareholders Agreement (except the restriction contained in Section 10 of the 
Shareholders Agreement) relating to any transfer or sale (whether made in the past or to be made 
in the future) to Greg Schenk of the Shares transferred in the 1999 Transfer; 
RESOLVED FURTHER that this unanimous written consent have the same force and 
effect as a unanimous vote of the undersigned directors at a meeting that has been duly called, 
convened and held in accordance with the Act and the articles of incorporation and bylaws of the 
Company; and 
RESOLVED FURTHER that this unanimous written consent may be executed in any 
number of counterparts and together such counterparts shall constitute one original document. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned directors have executed this Unanimous 
Written Consent of Directors of Cookietree, Inc. to be effective as of the date first written above. 
Harold Rosemann Date 
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WAIVER AND CONSENT 
This Waiver and Consent (this "Waiver") is made as of May 17, 2005 by each of the 
undersigned shareholders (each a "Shareholder," and collectively, the "Shareholders") of 
Cookietree, Inc.. a Utah corporation ("Cookietree"). 
BACKGROUND 
A. The Shareholders are parties to that certain Shareholders' Agreement dated as of 
January 28, 1991 among Cookietree and certain shareholders of Cookietree (the "Shareholders 
Agreement"). 
B. Pursuant to that certain Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement dated August 16, 
1999 between the estate of Boyd F. Schenk and Greg F. Schenk, the estate of Boyd F. Schenk 
transferred 545,200 Shares to Greg F. Schenk (the "1999 Transfer"). 
C. Pursuant to Section 11 of the Shareholders Agreement, the Shareholders desire 
now to consent to the waiver of all restrictions in the Shareholders Agreement on the transfer or 
sale to Greg Schenk of the Shares transferred in the 1999 Transfer (except the restriction 
contained in Section 10 of each of the Shareholders Agreement). 
WAIVER AND CONSENT 
1. Defined Terms. Capitalized terms in this Wavier that are not otherwise defined in 
this Waiver have the meanings given those terms in the 1999 Shareholders Agreement. 
2. Waiver. Pursuant to Section 11 of the Shareholders Agreement, each of the 
Shareholders hereby waives and consents to the waiver of the provisions of the Shareholders 
Agreement (except the restriction contained in Section 10 of the Shareholders Agreement) 
relating to any transfer or sale to Greg Schenk of the Shares transferred in the 1999 Transfer. 
3. Counterparts: Facsimile. This acknowledgement, waiver and consent may be 
executed in duplicate counterparts, each of which, when executed, shall be deemed to be an 
original, and all of which together shall be deemed one and the same instrument. A facsimile 
copy or other accurate copy of this acknowledgement, waiver and consent or any counterpart of 
this acknowledgement, waiver and consent is binding as an original. 
[Signature pages follow.] 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Shareholder has executed this Waiver and 
Consent as of the date first set forth above. 
SHAREHOLDER: 
C ^ V ^ ^ f ^ ^ T Q ^ < < • ~ 3/C*,000 
Name Number of shares held as of August 
16,1999 
Date 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Shareholder has executed this Waiver and 
Consent as of the date first set forth above. 
SHAREHOLDER: 
'Z, /'2j\ Z O O 
Number of shares held as of August 
16,1999 
/ 7 why 
Date ' 
o£~ 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Shareholder has executed this Waiver and 
Consent as of the date first set forth above. 
SHAREHOLDER: 
^ j e ^ W / g ^ szq pan 
wjjfc / Number of shares hcl 
/ / 16, 1999 
eld as of August 
Q5* J/7 /^LOOS 
Date 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 QAi 
a*. s*LTu«eeou«ry 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SAMUEL R. MCLAUGHLIN and JOHN : 
DOES 1-10, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GREG SCHENK; ESTATE OF BOYD SCHENK; 
ANNA SCHENK; COOKIETREE, INC.; and : 
JOHN DOES 1-10, 
: 
Defendants. 
SAMUEL R- MCLAUGHLIN, 
RULING AND ORDER 
Consolidated 
CASE NOS. 040924997 
050906729 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COOKIETREE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and GREG SCHENK, 
Defendants. 
On February 26, 2 0 07, the Court heard argument on two pending 
Motions for Summary Judgment filed by defendants in these consolidated 
actions. Matthew M. Durham, Esq., argued the Motions for defendants, and 
Margaret H. Olson, Esq., argued for plaintiff. Following argument, the 
Court took the matters under advisement. 
One of the Motions has been pending for over twenty months. The 
background is that, following consolidation of these actions, the Court 
addressed some Motions, particularly defendants' argument that the 
employment-related claims were the subject of an arbitration agreement. 
UrsTU 
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The court also addressed, and granted, a Motion to Stay the non-
arbitrable claims. 
Both the parties and the Court have referred to the matters 
consolidated into the one action as "Complaint A" (the non-employment-
related matters, including such claims as wrongful appropriation of 
corporate opportunity, breach of fiduciary duty, and related matters) , 
and "Complaint B" (which addresses the employment agreement-related 
claims). Following hearing on November 22, 2005, among other rulings, the 
Court ordered that the Complaint B causes of action were subject to 
arbitration. The Motion filed on June 29, 2005, relates to all of the 
claims asserted in Complaint A. The Motion filed on January 12, 2007, 
relates to any claims potentially remaining in Complaint B, recognizing 
that arbitration has been completed pursuant to the Court's Order. Both 
Motions were argued on February 26, 2007. I will first address the 
Motion filed by defendants in January, 2007, which is directed to 
Complaint B. 
As already noted, the Court previously granted Cookietree's Motion 
to Compel Arbitration, and action on Complaint A was stayed pending 
completion of that arbitration. Based on some agreement between the 
parties (particularly concerning a non-competition agreement), the only 
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claims in Complaint B submitted to the arbitrator were the claims for 
breach of employment contract against Cookietree, plaintiff's claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against 
Cookietree, and his claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Greg 
Schenk, in his individual capacity. 
On January 2, 2007, the arbitrator issued a decision on plaintiff's 
claims, which resolved all issues, except the issue of breach of 
fiduciary duty claim. Because the fiduciary duty claim was left 
unresolved by the arbitrator, Mr. Schenk has now requested this Court to 
dismiss that claim, as it is asserted in Complaint B, which Complaint 
relates solely to the employment relationship. 
The Court will address below the issue of whether any fiduciary duty 
claim asserted in Complaint A is still viable, but this first part of the 
Court's ruling deals solely with Complaint B. 
This distinction is important, because as the Court understands the 
arguments, and reads the Amended Complaint, all of the causes of action 
in Complaint B arise from the employment relationship. For all of the 
reasons stated by defendant Schenk, the Court finds that Mr. Schenk did 
not owe any fiduciary duty to Mr. McLaughlin that applies to the dealings 
related to Mr. McLaughlin in his role as an employee. In addition, Mr. 
I AJ1/A 
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Schenk did not terminate Mr. McLaughlin from his employment. That was 
an action of Cookietree, of which Mr. Schenk was admittedly President, 
but Mr. Schenk1s role as officer of the corporation does not create any 
new fiduciary relationship to Mr. McLaughlin. Accordingly, the remaining 
cause of action in Complaint B (that is, the one claim not resolved by 
the arbitrator) , alleging breach of fiduciary duty against Mr. Schenk, 
or a request for constructive trust (which is a remedy, rather than a 
cause of action), be and hereby is dismissed. 
Turning to Complaint A, which is the subject of the Motion filed in 
2005, the Court notes that the consolidation of the actions appears to 
have created some confusion regarding which causes of action are at issue 
in the two Motions for Summary Judgment that were argued on February 26, 
2007. That is, plaintiff has argued that Mr. Schenk breached his 
fiduciary duty in several ways, including the stock purchase from Mr. 
Schenk's father's widow; negotiation of the sale of Cookietree to Otis 
Spunkmeyer (a sale that never occurred) ; and the termination of Mr. 
McLaughlin. As already noted, to the extent the breach of a fiduciary 
duty claim relates in any way to the employment and termination, 
regardless of whether said claim is asserted in Complaint A, Complaint 
B (or, as it appears, in both Complaints), the Court finds that there is 
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no fiduciary duty owed by Mr. Schenk or Cookietree to Mr. McLaughlin, and 
all employment-related claims are now completely resolved. 
With respect to the stock sale, the propriety of that sale (which 
was based upon the terms of the 1991 shareholder's agreement), the Court 
finds that all of the actions taken by both Cookietree and Mr. Schenk 
were within the terms of the agreement and, to the extent certain 
corporate actions were not undertaken at the time of the sale, the 2005 
waiver and ratification actions were effective as a matter of law. 
To the extent the breach of fiduciary duty claim relates to the 
proposed sale to Otis Spunkmeyer, the sale never occurred and there is 
absolutely no evidence of any damage that plaintiff incurred as a result 
of the activities surrounding the non-existent sale. Because damages are 
an essential element of any claim, the absence of any evidence of damage 
is fatal to a claim based on a proposed sale to Otis Spunkmeyer, that 
never occurred. 
Based on the foregoing conclusions, the Court is unable to identify 
any factual claim in plaintiff's Complaint that would give rise to a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. For a fiduciary duty claim to be 
present in this case, plaintiff would need to identify a duty, breach, 
and damages, separate from any of the contractual obligations that 
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existed between the parties. To date, he has failed to do so. 
Considering each of the causes of action briefly, the Court rules as 
follows: 
With respect to the claim for wrongful appropriation of a corporate 
opportunity, if that claim is solely based upon the purchase of the 
corporation's shares, that is not legally a corporate opportunity. To 
the extent it may implicate the proposed sale to Otis Spunkmeyer, for the 
reasons stated regarding damages, that circumstance will not support a 
claim for wrongful appropriation of corporate opportunity. 
The Court has already addressed the breach of fiduciary duty claim 
set forth in the second cause of action. The Court's determination is 
that to the extent that claim relates to the employment relationship, 
purchase of its shares, or the Otis Spunkmeyer sale, there is no evidence 
before the Court supporting that claim. In an abundance of caution, the 
Court will not dismiss the second cause of action at this time, but it 
will be plaintiff's burden to identify any other factual basis for a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim, independent of any contract or other duty 
already alleged, if he chooses to go forward on his second cause of 
action, and that claim may not implicate the three issues identified 
herein. 
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The third cause of action, mismanagement, and the fourth cause of 
action, corporate waste, both appear to the Court to be merely 
duplicative of the other claims. Each addresses such issues as fiduciary 
duty, the transfer of the shares to Greg Schenk, and to some degree the 
proposed Spunkmeyer sale. These causes of action be and hereby are 
dismissed. Finally, the civil conspiracy claim can only exist in 
conjunction with at least one other claim that is found to be legitimate. 
Because the Court has left the door open for plaintiff to identify some 
as yet unidentified factual basis for a breach of fiduciary duty, the 
fifth cause of action shall not be dismissed at this time. 
The foregoing ruling represents the Court's Order regarding the two 
pending Motions for Summary Judgment. In summary, all causes of action, 
with the possible exception of the breach of fiduciary duty claim 
unrelated to the issues specifically addressed, and the civil conspiracy 
claim, are dismissed. The burden is on plaintiff to come forward with 
i sir 
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facts and evidence that would support a breach of fiduciary duty claim 
that has not already been addressed 
Dated this _day of April, 2007 
R^BE^T TC. HIL'DER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDG 
I CSvH 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this <*^ day of April, 2007: 
Margaret H. Olson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
466 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Matthew M. Durham 
Justin B. Palmer 
Attorneys for Defendants Greg Schenk 
and Cookietree 
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
George M. Haley 
Richard D. Flint 
Attorneys for Defendant Anna Schenk 
299 S. Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIC^rd J u d f c f c ^ 
5/sfr/ct 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH AUG - g 200? 
^ P c / e T T SAMUEL R. MCLAUGHLIN and JOHN 
DOES 1-10, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GREG SCHENK; ESTATE OF BOYD 
SCHENK, ANNA SCHENK, COOKIETREE 
INC., a Utah corporation, and JOHN DOES 
1-10, 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 040924997 
Judge Robert K. Hllder 
This matter is currently before me on plaintiff Samuel McLaughlin's: (1) Motion to Amend 
Ruling & Order; (2) Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award; and (3) Motion to Amend Complaint. The 
case has been argued and decided, and the pending motion is well-briefed. I do no find that 
additional argument will aid determination of the matter. Accordingly, I now issue the following 
rulings as stated herein. 
(1) Motion to Amend 
Mr. McLaughlin asks the Court to amend its April 25, 2007, Order in order to state the 
grounds for its decision in terms of plaintiff's numerous defenses to the 2005 waiver and ratification 
issues. Pursuant to Rule 52(a), when addressing a motion for summary judgment based on more 
than one ground, I am required to "issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision." 
Upon consideration, I find that my April 25, 20071, ruling fully comports with the requirements of 
'In that ruling, I state, "[w]ith respect to the stock sale, the propriety of that sale (which 
was based upon the terms of the 1991 shareholder's agreement) the court finds that all of the 
actions taken by both Cookietree and Mr. Schenk were within the terms of the agreement and, 
to the extent certain corporate actions were not undertaken at the time of the sale, the 2005 
waiver and ratification actions were effective as a matter of law." 
^ ^ ^ 
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Rule 52(a) and therefore I decline plaintiffs invitation to provide further clarification. 
(2) Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award 
On April 7, 2007, arbitrator Lois Baar entered her Arbitration Award and denied Mr. 
McLaughlin's request for attorney fees. Through his pending motion Mr. McLaughlin requests that 
I vacate Ms. Baar's award based upon her alleged failure to allow plaintiff to present evidence, call 
witnesses or ultimately articulate the theory of his case. 
Utah's Uniform Arbitration Act, Utah Code Ann., Section 78-31a-124, provides specific 
circumstances under which a reviewing court may vacate an arbitrator's award. Here, other than 
the somewhat amorphous claims of "misconduct" and acting "contrary to statute," plaintiff does not 
cite to a specific provision of the statute supporting vacatur. Accordingly, based upon the absence 
of a specific violation under the Act, along with Utah's strong presumption in favor of upholding an 
arbitrator's award, I deny Mr. McLaughlin's request to vacate. 
(3) Motion to Amend Complaint to Add Parties & Causes of Action 
In my April 25, 2007 Ruling I commented on amendment of the complaint by stating, 
For a fiduciary duty claim to be present in this case, plaintiff would need to identify 
a duty, breach and damages, separate from any of the contractual obligations that 
existed between the parties.... [I]t will be plaintiff's burden to identify any other 
factual basis for a breach of fiduciary claim, independent of any contract or other 
duty already alleged.... The burden is on plaintiff to come forward with facts and 
evidence that would support a breach of fiduciary claim that has not already been 
addressed. 
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In light of that language, Mr. McLaughlin now requests that I allow amendment of his 
complaint so he may address an alleged tort-based fiduciary duty that arose between the 
shareholders of this closely held corporation. 
While my April 25, 2007, Ruling left open the possibility of an amendment, I find that Mr. 
McLaughlin has not met the requirement to do so; namely, the identification of evidence that "has 
not already been addressed." Specifically, the evidence that plaintiff posits in support his "new" 
breach of fiduciary duty claim (the 1999 stock transfer, the termination of employment, the 
reduction of McLaughlin's salary and negotiation of the sale of Cookietree) has all been previously 
addressed. I find the absence of any "new" evidence would make the proposed amendment futile 
and therefore plaintiffs Motion to Amend is denied. 
Dated this 6th day of August, 2007. 
By the COUP 
Robert». Hnder 
District Court Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling, to the 
following, this (t> day of Julyf2007: 
Lincoln W. Hobbs 
Margaret H. Olson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
466 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3342 
Matthew M. Durham 
Justin B. Palmer 
Attorneys for Defendants Greg Schenk 
and Cookietree 
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Richard D. Flint 
Attorney for Defendant Anna Schenk 
299 S. Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263 
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LINCOLN W. HOBBS, #4848 
MARGARET H. OLSON, #6296 
Of Counsel 
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C. 
525 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 519-2555 
Facsimile: (801) 519-2999 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SAMUEL R. MCLAUGHLIN and JOHN 
DOES 1-10, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
GREG SCHENK, GAYLE SCHENK, 
HAROLD ROSEMANN, ESTATE OF BOYD 
SCHENK, ANNA SCHENK, 
COOKIETREE, INC. a Utah 
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1-
10, 
Defendants. 
(Proposed) SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
CONSOLIDATED 
Civil No. 040924997 MI 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Plaintiff, Samuel R. McLaughlin, hereby complains and 
alleges against Defendants as follows: 
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiff Samuel R. McLaughlin is an individual 
residing in the State of Utah: McLaughlin was employed by 
Defendant Cookietree, Inc. from 1992 until August, 2004. 
McLaughlin is a shareholder of Defendant Cookietree, Inc. 
2. Plaintiffs John Does 1-10 are past and present 
shareholders of Defendant Cookietree, Inc. who may have suffered 
similar injury to Plaintiff as a result of Defendants' conduct; 
however, the identities and/or individual claims of John Does 
1-10 are presently unknown. 
3. Defendant Greg Schenk is an individual residing in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. At all times relevant hereto, Greg Schenk 
was also a shareholder, the President and a director of 
Defendant Cookietree, Inc. 
4. Defendant Gayle Schenk is an individual residing in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. At all times relevant hereto, Gayle Schenk 
was married to Greg Schenk and was a director of Defendant 
Cookietree, Inc. 
5. Defendant Harold Rosemann is an individual residing in 
Salt Lake County, Utah. At all times relevant hereto, Harold 
Rosemann was the Chief Financial Officer of Cookietree, Inc., a 
shareholder in Cookietree, Inc. and a director of Defendant 
Cookietree, Inc. 
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6. Defendant Estate of Boyd Schenk is an entity under the 
Uniform Probate Code and exists, on information and belief, in 
the State of Missouri. The decedent, Boyd Schenk, was a 
shareholder of Defendant Cookietree, Inc. at the time of his 
death. Jurisdiction over the Estate is proper pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. 78-27-24. 
7. Defendant Anna Schenk was the wife of Boyd Schenk at the 
time of his death in November, 1998. On information and belief, 
Anna Schenk was Boyd Schenk's sole heir. Anna Schenk is a 
resident of the State of New York. Jurisdiction over Anna 
Schenk is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-27-24 
8. Defendant Cookietree, Inc. ("Cookietree") is a Utah 
Corporation authorized to do business in the State of Utah. 
9. Defendants John Does 1-10 are persons acting in concert 
with the named Defendants but who have not yet been identified 
and/or whose actions subjecting them to liability for the Causes 
of Action pled below have not been discovered. 
10. This action arises from stock transactions performed 
and retaliatory and punitive actions taken in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. Jurisdiction is therefore proper pursuant to 
3 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3-4 and 78-27-24. Venue is proper pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-13-4 and 78-13-7. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
11. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 10 above 
as if fully set forth herein. 
12. Cookietree was formed in 1981 under the laws of the 
State of Utah. Currently, Cookietree has authorized 5,000,000 
shares of common stock. 
13. Defendants Greg Schenk and Boyd Schenk were among the 
original shareholders of Cookietree. 
14. On January 28, 1991 the shareholders of Cookietree, 
including both Schenks, entered into a Shareholders Agreement 
("1991 Shareholders Agreement") which placed restrictions on the 
sale or transfer of Cookietree stock. 
15. On or about March 9, 1991, Boyd Schenk was issued 
stock certificate #11 representing 1,363,200 shares of 
Cookietree common stock. On or about the same date, Greg Schenk 
was issued stock certificate #10 representing 1,363,200 shares 
of Cookietree common stock. 
16. On or about December 14, 1992 Cookietree hired 
Plaintiff Sam McLaughlin and entered into an Employment 
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Agreement with him. The Employment Agreement provided 
McLaughlin with stock options allowing McLaughlin to acquire up 
to 200,000 shares of Cookietree common stock. The Employment 
Agreement noted that the shares "would be xrestricted 
securities' . . . and subject to various restrictions on 
transfer." 
17. Later, in 1993, Cookietree and McLaughlin entered into 
an Incentive Stock Option Agreement defining McLaughlin's option 
to purchase an additional 200,000 shares of Cookietree common 
stock. This Agreement provided that "upon exercise of any 
options granted herein [McLaughlin agrees] to become a party to 
and execute and deliver to the Company the [1991 Shareholders 
Agreement]." This Agreement further provided that u[a]s a 
condition to the grant to [McLaughlin] of the options . . . 
[McLaughlin] agrees to execute a counterpart of and become a 
party to [the 1991 Shareholders Agreement] or any successor 
agreement or agreements thereto." 
18. On or about October 19, 1995, Sam McLaughlin was 
issued stock certificate #16 representing 2,000 shares of 
Cookietree common stock in partial exercise of his options. 
Certificate #16 bears a notation: 
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"The shares represented by this certificate are 
subject to a right of first refusal option in favor of 
the corporation and certain of its shareholders, as 
provided in a Shareholders' Agreement dated January 
28th, 1991." 
19. On April 1, 1998 Sam McLaughlin purchased 50,000 
additional shares of Cookietree common stock and was issued 
stock certificate #25. Certificate #25 bears a notation: 
"The shares represented by this certificate are 
subject to a right of first refusal option in favor of 
the corporation and certain of its shareholders, as 
provided in a Shareholders' Agreement dated January 
28th, 1991." 
20. Cookietree's Board of Directors approved these 
transactions, and other related transactions, on April 1, 1998, 
21. On November 28, 1998 Boyd Schenk died. Boyd Schenk 
owned 545,200 shares of Cookietree common stock at the time of 
his death which became part of his estate. 
22. Boyd Schenk's will left all his property, including 
these shares, to his wife, Anna Schenk. 
23. On information and belief, Boyd Schenk's estate was 
probated in the State of Missouri. 
24. On or about July 1, 1999 McLaughlin purchased an 
additional 100,000 shares of Cookietree common stock and was 
issued stock certificate #28. This certificate bears the same 
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restriction on transfer as McLaughlin's other Cookietree stock 
certificates. 
25. At some time, either before or after Boyd Schenk's 
death, certificate #11 was surrendered and replacement 
certificates #17 and #18 were issued in the amount of 818,000 
shares and 545,200 shares, respectively. 
26. Certificate #18 for 545,200 shares was issued to Greg 
Schenk. He was issued replacement certificate #31. The 
company's stock transfer ledger reflects that these shares were 
transferred to Greg Schenk on August 16, 1999, approximately 9 
months after Boyd Schenk's death. 
27. The transfer of Boyd Schenk's 545,200 shares to Greg 
Schenk (hereinafter "the 1999 transaction") is not mentioned or 
approved in the Minutes or written records of Cookietree for 
1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 or 2004. 
28. The 1999 transaction was conducted without following 
the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders Agreement, which, among 
other things, granted McLaughlin and others a first right of 
refusal on the shares. 
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29. The 1999 transaction was kept secret and not disclosed 
to Cookietree shareholders, who shared similar rights under the 
1991 Shareholders Agreement, until after 2004. 
30. On or about November 1, 1999 the Cookietree's Board of 
Directors approved a new Shareholders Agreement (hereinafter 
"the 1999 Shareholders Agreement'7) . 
31. On or about May 31, 2002, without knowledge of the 
1999 transaction, McLaughlin purchased an additional 98,000 
shares of Cookietree common stock and was issued stock 
certificate #39. 
32. On or about June 12, 2002 Greg Schenk surrendered 
certificate #s 10, 19 and 31 and was issued replacement 
certificate #32 for 2,726,400 shares of Cookietree common stock. 
On the same date Sam McLaughlin surrendered certificate #s 16, 
25 and 28 and was issued replacement certificate #35 
representing 152,000 shares. 
33. On or about March 21, 2003 McLaughlin gave Cookietree 
a letter of intent to purchase Cookietree for $12,000,000. 
McLaughlin ultimately was only able to raise $9,000,000 and the 
deal did not close. 
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34. McLaughlin continued to negotiate with Cookietree to 
purchase Cookietree. Schenk repeatedly indicated that he would 
not offer McLaughlin first right of refusal to purchase 
Cookietree stock, despite the provisions in the 1991 Shareholder 
Agreement. Schenk's behavior toward McLaughlin changed and he 
tried to coerce McLaughlin through thinly-veiled threats and 
intimidation to forego his rights as a shareholder and stop his 
efforts to purchase Cookietree. 
35. By at least January 2004 Cookietree was actively 
involved in negotiations with Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. ("Otis"), a 
competitor in the industry. Otis sought to acquire Cookietree. 
36. McLaughlin, as minority shareholder, indicated his 
unwillingness sell his shares to Otis and demanded his right of 
first refusal under the 1991 Shareholders Agreement. 
37. At or around this same time, McLaughlin discovered the 
conduct alleged in paragraphs 25 - 26 above. 
38. McLaughlin announced that he was unwilling to overlook 
Schenk's and Cookietree's breaches. 
39. On or about March 30, 2004 Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. gave 
Cookietree a letter of intent to purchase Cookietree for 
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$12,000,000 to $14,000,000. Over the course of the next year, 
Otis made several more offers to purchase Cookietree's stock. 
40. By April 2004 Schenk overtly refused to allow and 
ignored McLaughlin's attempt to match Otis' offer to purchase 
Cookietree and signed the letter of intent. 
41. McLaughlin, as a shareholder, made written request to 
Cookietree to produce its corporate records in an effort to 
discover information about the 1999 transaction and Schenk's 
acquisition of Cookietree additional shares. 
42. McLaughlin hired an attorney to enforce his rights and 
the attorney made demand on Cookietree to offer McLaughlin first 
right of refusal. Schenk and Cookietree refused and continued 
to negotiate with Otis. 
43. A few days after McLaughin's written request for 
information, Cookietree terminated McLaughlin without cause and 
without notice. McLaughlin's Employment Contract required 6 
months notice. 
44. Cookietree and Schenk trespassed McLaughlin from 
company property, disconnected his telephone extension and email 
and refused to provide him with employment references. 
Cookietree and Schenk then reduced McLaughlin's severance 
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payments (to which he was contractually entitled) to 1992 
levels. These actions were intended to place McLaughlin in 
financial difficulty so he would give up his shareholder rights 
under the 1991 and 1999 Shareholder. Agreements. 
45. These actions were in direct retaliation for 
McLaughlin's exercise of his shareholder rights. The 
termination was intended to harm McLaughlin economically, force 
him to accept the sale of Cookietree to Otis (and sign a non-
compete with them) and give up his shareholders rights, 
Employment Agreement rights and forgive Cookietree and Schenk's 
violations of fiduciary duty. 
46. Immediately after McLaughlin's termination, Cookietree 
and Schenk told McLaughlin they would only consider a "global 
resolution" in which McLaughlin would resolve his Employment 
Agreement rights in connection with his previously asserted 
shareholder rights. 
47. McLaughlin declined to "globally resolve" his claims 
and sued. 
48. In April 2005, Cookietree's Board of Directors, 
consisting of Harold Rosemann, Gayle Schenk and Greg Schenk held 
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a regularly noticed and scheduled board meeting. Nothing about 
the 1999 transaction was considered or discussed. 
49. In May 2005, on the advice of litigation counsel, 
Cookietree's Board of Directors held another meeting for which 
no notice was given. The Board and each of them voted to ratify 
the 1999 transaction and waive the requirements of the 1991 
Shareholder's Agreement. 
50. At the time of the May 2005 Board meeting, the 1991 
Shareholder's Agreement was no longer in force or effect. 
51. The two Schenks and Mr. Rosemann, by their own 
testimony, agreed to the waiver and ratification because "it 
followed Boyd Schenk's wishes." None of the directors can 
identify a corporate purpose for the waiver and ratification. 
Rather, the motivations were characterized by self-interest, 
financial gain and retaliation against McLaughlin. 
52. At the time of the waiver and ratification, Boyd 
Schenk had been dead for six and one-half (6 H) years. 
53. Directors Gayle Schenk and Greg Schenk, husband and 
wife, benefited personally from the waiver and ratification. 
The value of Cookietree stock had increased over the six (6) 
years Greg owned it. They received six years of significant 
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corporate dividends and in the future will continue to receive 
dividends. 
54. Director Harold Roseman also had a conflicting 
interest in the transaction. He is an at-will employee of 
Cookietree, Inc. subject to termination if he does not agree 
with Greg Schenk. He personally was awarded the opportunity to 
buy Cookietree stock at the time of the 1999 stock; a 
transaction in which he was necessarily complicitious as 
Secretary of the Board. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty) 
55. Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 54 
above as if fully set forth herein. 
56. Cookietree is a close corporation. Greg Schenk was the 
majority shareholder, CEO and President of the Board. His wife, 
Gayle, was a member of the Board. The third Board member, 
Harold Rosemann was also a shareholder and the company CFO, 
employed at will. McLaughlin was a minority shareholder and 
employee. 
57. By operation of law, fiduciary duties existed among 
and between the Schenks, Rosemann and McLaughlin. 
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a. The shareholders of a close corporation share a 
fiduciary relationship which imposes upon all 
shareholders the duty to act in good faith and 
fairness with regard to their respective 
interests as shareholders. 
b. Officers and directors owe a fiduciary duty to 
the company and to minority shareholders. Among 
the many aspects of this duty, directors owe the 
shareholders a duty not to favor one shareholder 
over another. 
58. Officers and directors of a corporation are personally 
liable for torts of the corporation or of its other officers and 
agents if they participate in the wrongful activity. 
59. The two Schenks and Rosemann used their positions with 
the corporation and used the corporation for the purpose of 
promoting personal interest at the expense of another 
shareholder. 
60. In May, 2005 Gayle .Schenk, Greg Schenk and Harold 
Rosemann and each of the personally participated in the breaches 
of fiduciary duty committed agaist McLaughlin when they ratified 
and waived a transaction in which they had a personal interest. 
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61. Defendants' conduct toward McLaughlin was a breach of 
fiduciary duty, not in the best interest of the corporation and 
motivated by self-interest and malice. 
62. McLaughlin has been damaged by Defendants' breaches of 
duty. 
63. McLaughlin was unable to acquire his pro rata share of 
Cookietree stock at the time of the 1999 transaction. He has 
been deprived of the appreciated value of those shares over 
eight (8) years and past and future dividends from those 
additional shares. 
64. As further items of damage, McLaughlin was frozen out 
of the company, terminated, had his severance cut and put on the 
street without notice, resulting in lost wages and income. 
These actions were taken in direct retaliation for his challenge 
of the 1999 transaction and assertion of shareholder rights to 
buy the company and are damages flowing from the breaches of 
fiduciary duty. 
65. McLaughlin should be awarded punitive damages as a 
result of Defendants' breaches of fiduciary duty. 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, McLaughlin prays for Judgment as follows: 
1. For judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendants in a sum to be determined at trial; 
2. In addition to his actual damages, punitive damages in 
an amount to deter Defendants and other individuals similarly 
situated from further and similar conduct; 
3. On all causes of action, that Plaintiff recovers his 
costs and prejudgment interest; 
4. On all causes of action, that Plaintiff recovers his 
attorney's fees; 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and equitable. 
DATED this 3f day of May, 2007. 
LINCOLN W. HOBBS 
MARGARET H. OLSON, Of Counsel 
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's address: 
3979 Saddleback Road 
Park City, UT 84098 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused a trne and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be delivered as follows: 
KT ] Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Fed Ex 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Personally Served 
Matthew M. Durham 
Justin E. Palmer 
STOEL RIVES, L.L.P. 
201 South Main Street, #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Fax No. 578-6999 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Greg Schenk and Cookietree, Inc. 
Mail 
Fax 
Fed Ex 
Hand Delivery 
Personally Served 
Richard D. Flint 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
299 South Main Street, #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Fax No. 521-9639 
Attorneys for Defendants Anna 
Schenk and Estate of Boyd Schenk 
DATED this 3( day of m A *U^~) 2007. 
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